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Business Crime Defence

Court practice shift on internal investigation management under Russian law: a briefing note

Vitaliy Vetrov · March 2026 · 10 min read

Russian courts are tightening oversight of internal investigation management. What foreign executives need to know in 2026. Make an enquiry.

In recent years of advising foreign managers and expat executives operating within Russian corporate structures, a clear pattern has emerged from court and investigative practice: the way in which an internal investigation is managed — its scope, its documentation, the decisions made about what to preserve and what to disclose — has become an independent factor in assessments of individual criminal exposure under Russian law. This shift did not originate in a single statutory amendment. It has developed through accumulated case practice and changes in how investigative authorities approach corporate misconduct, and by mid-2026 it has reached a point where foreign managers cannot treat internal investigation procedure as a matter of internal HR governance alone. The stakes are, in the prevailing approach of Russian courts and investigators, considerably higher than that.

§ I. What has shifted in Russian court and investigative practice

Until relatively recently, the dominant understanding among foreign-managed Russian companies was that a well-conducted internal investigation served primarily a compliance and governance function: it satisfied shareholder expectations, informed decisions about personnel, and — where necessary — produced a record for regulators. The implicit assumption was that the investigation itself, provided it followed reasonable process, would be viewed neutrally by Russian investigative authorities.

That assumption has increasingly proved unreliable. Russian courts and the Investigative Committee have, in a pattern that has become pronounced across the past two to three years, begun to treat the management of an internal investigation as evidentiary material in its own right. Specifically, three areas of investigative practice have shifted:

The first concerns document preservation and access. Courts have generally held that decisions taken during an internal investigation — including decisions about which records to retain, which personnel to interview, and which conclusions to document — can be examined for evidence of intent. Where a manager is seen to have shaped the scope of an investigation in a way that excluded material adverse to themselves, this has, in a number of proceedings, been characterised as purposeful conduct rather than procedural oversight.

The second area concerns disclosure to investigative authorities. Under the prevailing approach as of mid-2026, the point at which a company becomes aware that state investigators have an interest — even an informal one — in the subject matter of an internal investigation materially changes the calculus. Continuing or restructuring an internal investigation without notifying counsel, or taking steps that could be characterised as evidence of parallel document management, has attracted adverse scrutiny in proceedings before Russian courts.

The third shift concerns the personal position of the manager who authorises or directs the investigation. Russian criminal procedure has always permitted examination of managerial decisions as evidence of knowledge and intent. What has changed is the threshold at which routine investigative oversight decisions become characterised as evidence of the manager's own culpable awareness. Foreign managers, in particular, have at times been caught by this shift precisely because their understanding of investigative conduct derives from jurisdictions — Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom — where internal investigations carry a different legal character and a different relationship with state authorities.

"The core risk for foreign managers is not the underlying allegation — it is the investigation of the investigation. How the process was structured, what was documented, and what was not, has become the evidentiary terrain." — Vitaliy Vetrov, Managing Partner, Vetrov & Partners

If you are a foreign executive overseeing or involved in an internal investigation in Russia and want to understand the current risk landscape, discuss your matter in confidence: info@vetrovpartners.com |

§ II. Which foreign managers and expat executives are most directly affected?

The practice shifts described above do not bear equally on all foreign managers in Russia. The profile of those most directly affected is relatively consistent.

General directors and their deputies are the most exposed category. Under Russian corporate law, the general director carries personal managerial responsibility, and investigative authorities routinely examine decisions taken at that level. Where an internal investigation has been authorised at general director level and the underlying subject matter subsequently becomes the subject of a criminal inquiry, the general director's role in shaping the investigation becomes a central evidentiary question.

Finance directors and chief compliance officers of foreign-owned Russian entities face a related exposure. These positions frequently sit at the intersection of the underlying allegation — typically involving asset diversion, contract irregularities, or accounting treatment — and the investigation that follows it. The compliance function, where it is held by a foreign national, has become a more prominent focal point for investigative authorities seeking to establish awareness of the conduct under scrutiny.

Board members of Russian subsidiaries — including those appointed by foreign parent companies primarily for governance or reporting purposes — are not exempt. Courts have examined the knowledge and decisions of supervisory board members in proceedings arising from corporate misconduct, and the fact that a board member is a foreign national operating under instructions from a parent company has not, in practice, provided consistent protection from that scrutiny.

There is a specific sub-category that warrants particular attention: foreign managers who authorise or participate in an internal investigation after becoming aware, informally, that Russian state investigators are interested in related subject matter. The decision to proceed — or to alter the scope of the investigation following that awareness — is precisely the kind of decision that courts have treated as evidence of knowledge and intent.

Foreign managers in each of these positions who operate under the assumption that internal investigation procedure is purely an internal governance matter are, on the basis of current Russian court and investigative practice, operating with an incomplete picture of their personal risk.

For in-house counsel at the foreign parent company seeking to understand exposure at the subsidiary level, an initial conversation with experienced Russian counsel is the practical first step: info@vetrovpartners.com |

§ III. What foreign managers and their advisers should do now

The practical response to this development is not to stop conducting internal investigations — there are strong governance reasons to conduct them, and in some circumstances legal obligations to do so. The response is to manage them differently, with the current Russian legal and investigative landscape as the operating environment.

There are three areas of immediate practical relevance.

The first is counsel involvement at the earliest stage. Russian criminal procedure creates a different dynamic than common law jurisdictions. The involvement of Russian-qualified criminal defence counsel from the point at which an internal investigation is authorised — not after it has concluded, and not only when a formal inquiry is opened — changes the nature of the document trail and the decisions that get recorded. This is not obstructive; it is the standard approach in Russian practice for any situation carrying criminal exposure.

The second is scope management. The decision about what an internal investigation will examine, what records it will request, and what conclusions it will document must be taken with Russian criminal procedure in mind. In practice, this means that the terms of reference for an internal investigation in a Russian entity should not be drafted in the same way as they would be for an equivalent exercise in a UK or German entity. The differences are material, and experienced Russian counsel can identify them at the outset.

The third is situational awareness regarding investigative authority interest. The moment at which informal indications emerge that state investigators are interested in any subject matter connected to an ongoing or planned internal investigation is a threshold moment. The failure to treat it as such has been, in a number of cases in Russian practice, the point at which a manageable situation became significantly more complicated.

For foreign expat executives who are already subject to investigative interest — formal or informal — the position requires separate and urgent analysis. The considerations are different, and the steps available depend on the stage of proceedings. This falls within the firm's Business Crime Defence practice, where the firm has acted for foreign nationals at various stages of Russian criminal proceedings.

§ IV. Open questions: what remains unclear in Russian practice?

Several aspects of this practice shift remain subject to ongoing development, and foreign managers should be aware that the picture is not entirely settled.

The boundary between legitimate investigative direction and conduct that attracts criminal characterisation has not been defined with the precision that practitioners and their clients would want. Courts have exercised considerable discretion in this area, and outcomes have not been uniform across federal districts. The West Siberian and Ural circuits have, as a general matter, applied relatively rigorous scrutiny to managerial decision-making in corporate misconduct proceedings; other circuits have shown more variation.

The position of foreign parent companies — and the extent to which instructions from a foreign parent regarding the conduct of a subsidiary-level investigation can be attributed to individual managers within the Russian entity — remains an area where court practice has not converged on a consistent approach. This matters for in-house counsel at the foreign parent who are directing or reviewing investigation strategy.

Similarly, the interaction between Russian criminal procedure and parallel proceedings in other jurisdictions — for example, an investigation being conducted simultaneously under German, Dutch, or UK law and procedure — is an area where early coordination between Russian counsel and the foreign legal team has become essential rather than optional. The firm works in coordination with external counsel in the relevant jurisdiction where cross-border matters require it; in accordance with the firm's practice, for matters governed by foreign law, we collaborate with trusted counsel in the relevant jurisdiction.

Frequently asked questions

Q: What specifically has changed in how Russian courts treat the management of internal investigations?

A: The principal shift is that Russian courts and investigative authorities have increasingly treated decisions made during an internal investigation — what to examine, what to document, what to preserve — as evidence of individual knowledge and intent. This is not a statutory change; it reflects an evolution in investigative and court practice that has become more consistent over the past two to three years. The practical consequence is that the conduct of an internal investigation can now itself become the subject of criminal scrutiny, separate from the underlying allegation that prompted it.

Q: Which categories of foreign manager or expat executive are most directly affected by this change?

A: The categories most directly affected are general directors and deputies of Russian entities, chief compliance officers and finance directors of foreign-owned Russian subsidiaries, and supervisory board members who hold governance appointments in Russian companies. Foreign nationals in each of these roles can find themselves subject to examination of their investigative oversight decisions in the event that the subject matter of an internal investigation intersects with a criminal inquiry by Russian investigative authorities. The risk is most acute where the manager had knowledge — even informal knowledge — of investigative authority interest in the relevant subject matter before or during the investigation.

Q: What should a foreign executive or expat manager do if they are currently overseeing or involved in an internal investigation in Russia?

A: The immediate practical step is to ensure that Russian-qualified criminal defence counsel is involved before the investigation concludes — ideally from the point of authorisation. In addition, the scope and documentation approach of the investigation should be reviewed against the current standards of Russian court and investigative practice. This is materially different from the approach that would be taken under German, UK, or Dutch law, and the differences matter for individual criminal exposure. Where there is any indication that Russian investigative authorities have an interest in related subject matter, that changes the analysis significantly and requires separate, specific advice.

Practitioner note

This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.

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