Russian corporate law imposes a mandatory approval procedure for major transactions. Foreign subsidiaries face real voidance risk. Make an enquiry.
In advising foreign multinationals on the governance of their Russian subsidiaries, one procedural gap surfaces with particular regularity: the failure to identify a proposed transaction as a "major transaction" under Russian corporate law before it is signed. The consequences of that omission — which can include voidance of the agreement at the initiative of a minority shareholder, unwanted public disclosure, or a challenge to the authority of the signatory — are disproportionate to the procedural effort that early identification would have required. For in-house counsel managing Russian entities from abroad, the major transaction procedure under Russian corporate law is not a formality; it is a structural governance requirement that directly conditions the enforceability of the company's commercial commitments.
Russian corporate legislation — applicable separately to joint-stock companies (JSCs) and limited liability companies (LLCs) through two parallel statutory frameworks — defines a major transaction as any transaction, or series of interconnected transactions, the subject matter of which involves property with a book value or price exceeding twenty-five per cent of the book value of the company's assets as determined from its most recent financial statements. The threshold is not assessed against transaction value in isolation: Russian law requires comparison against the company's total asset base on its statutory balance sheet, which for foreign-owned subsidiaries may reflect Russian accounting standards rather than IFRS.
The category of transactions potentially caught is broader than the threshold alone suggests. Loan agreements, security interests (pledges, sureties, and guarantees), lease agreements of material scope, and disposal of significant fixed assets all fall within the procedure's reach, provided the value threshold is met. Russian courts have also treated series of related transactions — entered into over a period and with a connected commercial purpose — as a single major transaction where the cumulative value exceeds the threshold, even if no individual agreement does so in isolation.
For foreign clients, a practical complexity arises at the subsidiary level: the assets against which the twenty-five per cent threshold is assessed are the assets of the Russian legal entity, not the consolidated group. A transaction that is routine for the group as a whole may nonetheless constitute a major transaction for a mid-sized Russian subsidiary with a comparatively modest balance sheet. This is a distinction that group-level approval matrices do not always capture.
If your Russian subsidiary is approaching a significant commercial transaction and you are uncertain whether it crosses the major transaction threshold — make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |
The approval of a major transaction does not follow a single procedural route. Russian corporate law allocates approval authority between the board of directors and the general meeting of shareholders (or participants, in the LLC context) according to the transaction's value relative to the company's assets, subject to modification in the company's charter.
For transactions falling between twenty-five and fifty per cent of total assets, the default allocation vests approval authority in the board of directors. For transactions exceeding fifty per cent, approval shifts to the general meeting of participants or shareholders and — depending on entity type and whether the charter provides otherwise — may require a qualified majority rather than a simple majority vote. The 2017 reform to both JSC and LLC legislation introduced significant flexibility: companies may now expand or restrict the default thresholds by charter provision, and may elect to disapply the major transaction procedure entirely where all participants or shareholders consent. This opt-out facility is used with some regularity in wholly owned subsidiaries, though its implementation requires a properly documented shareholder resolution amending the charter, which must then be registered with the tax authorities.
In practice, the approval meeting creates procedural obligations that carry their own complexity. Russian law prescribes content requirements for the approval resolution — specifying the counterparty, subject matter, price, and other material terms — and an approval resolution that is insufficiently specific may not protect the transaction from subsequent challenge. The resolution must also be documented in corporate minutes in the form required by the relevant statute, and it is not uncommon for foreign clients to discover, at the point of a due diligence review, that historical approval minutes are either missing or fail to satisfy the content requirements.
For foreign shareholders who also hold board positions or who exercise significant influence over the subsidiary's management, a further consideration arises: the interested-party transaction rules, which operate in parallel to the major transaction procedure, may impose an additional approval layer if the foreign shareholder or its affiliate is the counterparty to — or otherwise has an interest in — the transaction in question. Conflating the two procedures is a source of recurring error.
The procedural stakes of the major transaction framework are set by the consequence of non-compliance. Under Russian corporate law, a major transaction entered into without the required approval is voidable — not void ab initio — which means it remains effective unless and until a court sets it aside. The right to bring a voidance claim belongs to the company itself and to shareholders (or participants) who held an interest at the time the transaction was concluded, provided the claim is filed within the applicable limitation period running from the date the claimant knew or ought to have known of the violation.
That framing has one significant practical implication for foreign investors: in a company with minority participants alongside the foreign majority, a disgruntled minority participant holds a tool of considerable leverage. Where a transaction was entered into without the proper approval — or where the approval can be challenged on procedural grounds — the minority can initiate voidance proceedings, effectively putting the transaction itself at risk. Russian courts have set aside transactions in such circumstances, including transactions with third-party counterparties who were not party to the internal approval dispute.
"The voidance risk in Russian major transaction law is not theoretical: courts have set aside significant commercial agreements on procedural grounds that the parties considered mere formalities. The approval process is where the enforceability of the deal is actually made." — Stanislav Lastovsky, Senior Lawyer, Practice Lead — Restructuring & Insolvency, Vetrov & Partners
There is an important counterweight. Russian courts have developed a line of authority holding that a third-party counterparty acting in good faith — and without knowledge that the approval requirement was not met — is entitled to protection. The burden of establishing good faith rests on the counterparty, and where the third party had means to verify the approval but did not, courts have declined to afford that protection. For foreign counterparties transacting with Russian entities, requesting and reviewing the approval documentation before execution is both the commercial norm and the legally prudent step.
For in-house counsel managing a Russian subsidiary under live counterparty or shareholder pressure — speak to our team in confidence: info@vetrovpartners.com |
The major transaction procedure sits within a governance architecture designed for domestically owned Russian entities. When a foreign company holds the Russian entity — whether as a sole participant, a majority shareholder, or a joint venture partner — several structural features of the procedure require deliberate adaptation.
The first relates to group approval matrices. Multinational groups commonly maintain authority schedules or delegated authority frameworks that define, at group level, which transactions require sign-off at which organisational tier. These frameworks are designed for the group's own governance purposes and are generally not calibrated to the distinct requirements of Russian corporate law. A transaction that sits below the group's material transaction threshold may nonetheless constitute a major transaction for the Russian subsidiary, requiring formal corporate approval under Russian law before execution. Conversely, a transaction that triggers the group authority schedule may not require separate Russian corporate approval at all, if the subsidiary's asset base is large. The two frameworks operate independently, and neither substitutes for the other.
The second consideration concerns the mechanics of convening. For a wholly or majority foreign-owned subsidiary whose shareholder or participants sit abroad, the convening requirements for a general meeting or participant decision — including notice periods, delivery of materials, and documentation of resolutions by way of Russian-standard corporate minutes — create a logistical lead time that is frequently underestimated. In a commercial deal with a compressed timetable, discovering that shareholder approval is required — and that the convening formalities cannot be completed before the counterparty's signing deadline — is an avoidable problem that arises from insufficient early-stage analysis.
The third consideration is documentation. Where the Russian subsidiary maintains records in Russian, the approval minutes and supporting board or participant resolutions will be in Russian. Where those documents need to be provided to a foreign parent's compliance, legal, or audit function, or to a foreign lender conducting due diligence, certified translation and notarisation add to the preparation timeline. This is not a theoretical concern: in cross-border financing transactions where a Russian subsidiary's assets are being pledged, lender counsel routinely requests the full major transaction approval chain, and gaps in that chain can delay or imperil completion.
For companies operating in EAEU member states with Russian corporate subsidiaries, it is worth noting that the major transaction framework is a matter of Russian domestic corporate law and does not have a harmonised EAEU equivalent. The rules applicable to a Russian entity are set by Russian legislation regardless of the nationality or jurisdiction of the controlling shareholder. CIS framework documents do not alter this.
The most effective approach to major transaction risk is procedural prevention rather than post-hoc remedy. For foreign companies with Russian subsidiaries — particularly those managing Russian assets from group headquarters outside Russia — three practical measures consistently reduce exposure.
The first is threshold mapping at the subsidiary level. This means maintaining a current picture of the Russian subsidiary's total asset base (on a Russian statutory accounting basis) and using that figure to assess proposed transactions in advance. For subsidiaries with fluctuating or growing asset bases, this assessment should be refreshed at least annually and at any balance sheet date. The output of this exercise is a practical threshold figure — in roubles — below which no major transaction approval is required and above which the procedure is triggered. That figure, not a group-level materiality threshold, is the operative number.
The second measure is charter review and, where appropriate, charter modification. A wholly owned Russian subsidiary whose sole participant is a foreign holding company can, in many cases, disapply the major transaction procedure by unanimous participant decision and charter amendment. Where the opt-out is not appropriate — for instance, where minority participants exist — the charter can nonetheless be used to adjust the default board and general meeting thresholds, and to specify the procedural content requirements for approval resolutions in a way that reduces ambiguity. Charter modifications of this nature require registration and carry their own procedural steps, but they are a one-time governance investment with ongoing operational benefit.
The third measure is prospective approval for recurring transaction types. Russian law permits approval of a major transaction in advance — authorising a category of transactions up to a specified value ceiling for a defined period — rather than requiring case-by-case approval for each individual transaction. This facility is underused by foreign-owned subsidiaries, where the default assumption is often that each transaction requires its own corporate minute. Prospective approval, properly documented, substantially reduces the operational burden of the procedure for subsidiaries that regularly enter into transactions of a similar type.
For in-house counsel with oversight of Russian subsidiaries, the governance work required to implement these measures is modest relative to the risk of a voidance challenge to a material commercial agreement. The Corporate Governance practice at Vetrov & Partners advises foreign shareholders on subsidiary governance frameworks, charter structuring, and approval documentation.
If you are reviewing the governance framework for a Russian subsidiary and want to ensure the major transaction procedure is correctly embedded — request our practice review: info@vetrovpartners.com |
Q: What is the twenty-five per cent threshold measured against, and how does a foreign-owned subsidiary calculate it?
A: The threshold is measured against the book value of the company's total assets as recorded in its most recent approved financial statements under Russian statutory accounting standards. For a foreign-owned Russian subsidiary, this means the subsidiary's own balance sheet — not the consolidated group accounts. The relevant figure is calculated at the subsidiary level, which means a transaction that is immaterial at group level may nonetheless cross the threshold for the Russian entity. The practical implication is that the subsidiary's latest Russian accounting balance sheet should be the reference point for any pre-transaction assessment, and that figure should be reviewed at each financial year-end or whenever a significant asset change occurs.
Q: Can the major transaction procedure be disapplied entirely, and under what conditions?
A: Yes. Russian corporate law, as amended in 2017, permits companies to opt out of the major transaction procedure entirely by unanimous decision of all participants (in an LLC) or all shareholders (in a JSC), followed by amendment of the company's charter and registration of that amendment with the tax authorities. The opt-out is most practically available in wholly owned subsidiaries where the foreign parent is the sole participant or shareholder, since unanimity is straightforwardly achieved. Where minority participants exist, unanimous agreement may not be obtainable. It is also worth noting that the opt-out does not disapply the interested-party transaction rules, which are a separate and parallel framework and cannot be removed by the same mechanism.
Q: What is the limitation period for a voidance claim, and from when does it run?
A: Under the general rule in Russian corporate law, the limitation period for challenging a major transaction as void is one year. The period runs from the date on which the claimant knew or ought reasonably to have known of the grounds for challenge — which in practice commonly means the date of discovery of the defective approval process, not necessarily the date of the transaction itself. This means that a transaction entered into without proper approval may remain exposed to challenge for some time after execution, particularly if the omission is not immediately apparent to shareholders. For acquisitions and financing transactions, this is a due diligence point: the absence of historical approval documentation for major transactions is a material finding.
Q: Does the major transaction threshold apply separately to each individual agreement, or can related agreements be aggregated?
A: Russian courts have consistently applied an aggregation principle where a series of transactions is found to be interconnected — sharing a common commercial purpose, common counterparty, or common subject matter — even if each individual transaction falls below the twenty-five per cent threshold. The interconnected transactions are treated as a single major transaction for approval purposes. The risk is particularly acute in structures where a group enters into a framework agreement and a series of implementing agreements over time, or where security interests are granted separately from the underlying loan. Identifying whether a transaction is genuinely standalone or forms part of a series is a substantive legal assessment, not a mechanical calculation.
Q: How does the major transaction procedure interact with the group authority matrix of a foreign multinational?
A: The two frameworks operate independently. A group authority matrix governs internal delegation of authority within the corporate group and is not a matter of Russian corporate law. The major transaction procedure is a mandatory requirement of Russian statutory law and applies to the Russian entity regardless of what the group's internal governance documents provide. Neither framework satisfies the requirements of the other: a group sign-off that does not take the form of a Russian corporate approval resolution will not protect the transaction from a voidance challenge under Russian law, and conversely, a Russian corporate approval that falls below the group's materiality threshold does not relieve the manager of the obligation to obtain group-level sign-off. In-house counsel managing Russian subsidiaries should ensure both frameworks are satisfied independently.
This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.
Our team advises foreign clients on exactly these questions across Russia and the EAEU region. Initial 30-minute consultation — complimentary.
Make an enquiry