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Corporate & Regulatory

The law and practice of CEO liability and removal under Russian law

Stanislav Lastovsky · October 2026 · 15 min read

Russian law exposes CEOs to personal liability that foreign parent companies often underestimate. Know the removal and recovery rules. Make an enquiry.

In advising foreign companies on the governance of their Russian subsidiaries, one pattern recurs with particular consistency: the assumption that the CEO — referred to in Russian corporate law as the single executive body, or edinolichny ispolnitelny organ — carries broadly the same fiduciary obligations and removal constraints as a CEO or managing director under English, German, or US law. That assumption is incorrect in ways that create material exposure. Under the Russian legal framework applicable to limited liability companies and joint-stock companies, the chief executive is both more easily removed and more personally exposed to damages liability than counterparts in most Western jurisdictions. For in-house counsel at foreign parent companies, understanding this structure is not a theoretical exercise: it shapes how governance documents are drafted, how performance concerns are escalated, and — critically — how quickly action must be taken when things go wrong.

§ I. The legal position of the CEO under Russian corporate law

The single executive body occupies a defined statutory position in Russian company law. Whether the entity is a limited liability company (LLC) or a joint-stock company (JSC), the CEO is appointed by and reports to the general meeting of participants or shareholders, or — where the charter provides — to the board of directors. The CEO's authority to bind the company in transactions with third parties is presumed to be unlimited unless restrictions are registered in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities (EGRUL). This creates a practical asymmetry: internally, the charter may restrict the CEO's authority in significant ways; externally, those restrictions are largely unenforceable against third parties who transact in good faith.

The CEO acts as the company's legal representative without a power of attorney. This means the CEO can enter contracts, sign documents, and incur obligations on behalf of the company with no further authorisation — unless the transaction requires shareholder or board approval under the Russian legal framework (for example, as a major transaction or related-party transaction). Foreign parent companies that rely on internal approval matrices without verifying the corresponding charter provisions and EGRUL entries frequently discover that their Russian CEO has bound the company to transactions the parent did not sanction.

The standard of conduct expected of the CEO is set by what Russian courts describe as the obligation to act in good faith and reasonably. This standard does not directly replicate the business judgement rule familiar to US and UK practitioners. Russian courts apply it retrospectively, examining whether the CEO, at the moment of the contested decision, had adequate grounds for it and whether the decision fell within the range of commercially rational choices open to a reasonable manager in those circumstances. The standard has been elaborated substantially through court practice, and the current approach by Russian courts differs in important respects from the position that prevailed a decade ago — a point discussed further in Court practice shift on CEO liability and removal.

If your Russian subsidiary's governance documents have not been reviewed against the current regulatory framework — make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

§ II. Grounds for personal liability — what does Russian law require?

CEO liability under Russian law arises when the company — or, in insolvency, its creditors or the insolvency administrator — can demonstrate that the CEO's actions or omissions caused the company to suffer losses, and that the CEO acted in breach of the good faith and reasonableness standard. The framework is set out in civil legislation and supplemented by a detailed body of court practice, which has identified specific categories of conduct that typically satisfy the breach standard.

Conduct that Russian courts have consistently treated as establishing liability includes: entering into transactions on manifestly unfavourable terms without adequate justification; concealing information from the company's governing bodies; failing to take action to prevent foreseeable losses; causing the company to enter into transactions with counterparties that were obviously unreliable; and approving capital expenditure or disposals of assets at prices that deviate materially from market value. The courts are explicit that liability is not limited to cases of fraud or intentional wrongdoing — negligent management that causes loss is actionable.

The company bears the initial burden of showing that the CEO took the relevant act or omission and that loss resulted. The burden then shifts to the CEO to establish that they acted in good faith and reasonably. This reverse-burden structure is significant in practice: a CEO who cannot produce contemporaneous documentation — board minutes, transaction analyses, counterparty due diligence — is in a structurally weak position even if the transaction was commercially sensible at the time. For foreign parent companies seeking to recover losses from a Russian CEO, the quality of the company's internal records is therefore a threshold issue.

Under the Russian legal framework, a CEO who is a foreign national carries the same liability as a Russian citizen. There is no jurisdictional carve-out, and the company's claim is brought before the Russian arbitrazh court of the company's registered location, regardless of the CEO's nationality or current residence. This has particular relevance for in-house counsel managing situations where the CEO has departed Russia following a governance dispute.

§ III. Loss recovery — how does the company bring a claim, and what are the realistic outcomes?

A company's claim for losses against a former or current CEO is brought as a corporate claim before the arbitrazh court. The claim may be initiated by the company itself — through a new CEO or liquidator — or, in certain circumstances, by participants (shareholders) acting derivatively on the company's behalf. Minority shareholders holding a defined threshold of participation may bring the claim if the company itself does not act; this minority shareholder mechanism is an important check on situations where the controlling shareholder is unwilling to pursue the former CEO.

The limitation period for bringing a damages claim against a CEO is three years from the moment the company became aware — or should have become aware — of the CEO's breach and the resulting loss. In practice, this clock frequently begins running not at the moment the relevant transaction occurred, but at the moment a new CEO or auditor reviewed the company's position and identified the problem. This is a critical planning point: under the Russian legal framework, the discovery rule means that a company that acts promptly following a change in management may still have a viable claim for decisions taken several years earlier. Foreign parent companies that delay initiating a review of their Russian subsidiary's historical transactions risk losing the ability to recover losses that an earlier audit would have preserved.

The recoverable loss is calculated as direct damages — the difference between what the company received and what it would have received had the CEO acted properly. Lost profits are recoverable in principle but remain difficult to prove in Russian courts, which apply a conservative approach to hypothetical gain. The court may also order the CEO to return ill-gotten assets if the claim includes elements of unjust enrichment.

"The most significant practical challenge in CEO liability claims is not establishing the breach — it is documenting the quantum of loss in a way that Russian courts will accept. Companies that have maintained clean, contemporaneous management accounts are in a materially stronger position than those reconstructing the damage after the fact." — Stanislav Lastovsky, Senior Lawyer, Practice Lead — Restructuring & Insolvency, Vetrov & Partners

Enforcement of a judgment against a CEO who has left Russia raises additional considerations. Russian civil enforcement proceedings are conducted through the Federal Bailiff Service and are available against assets held in Russia. For assets held outside Russia, the judgment creditor must obtain recognition in the relevant foreign jurisdiction — a process that varies considerably by country and is not automatic. The Restructuring & Insolvency practice at Vetrov & Partners has experience in coordinating cross-border enforcement strategies in these circumstances.

If your company is considering a claim against a current or former CEO of a Russian subsidiary — discuss your matter in confidence: info@vetrovpartners.com |

§ IV. Removing a CEO — procedure, constraints, and what can go wrong

The removal of a CEO is, in principle, a straightforward corporate act: the general meeting of participants or shareholders (or the board, where the charter delegates this authority) adopts a resolution to terminate the CEO's powers and appoint a successor. The resolution takes effect from the date stated in it, and the change must be registered with the Federal Tax Service — the authority responsible for maintaining EGRUL — within the statutory period. Until the change is registered, the outgoing CEO remains the company's registered representative and can technically continue to bind the company in transactions with third parties.

This registration gap is a recurrent source of harm in contested removal situations. Where a CEO resists removal — by contesting the legality of the resolution, refusing to cooperate with the handover, or continuing to purport to act on the company's behalf — the company may face a window during which its legal position is contested and its ability to transact cleanly is impaired. The practical response is to obtain a court injunction restraining the outgoing CEO from exercising authority pending resolution of the challenge; Russian arbitrazh courts have granted such relief in well-documented cases, but the application must be made promptly and with adequate supporting evidence.

The outgoing CEO has the right to challenge the removal resolution on procedural grounds — for example, if the meeting was not properly convened, if notice was defective, or if the quorum or vote count was incorrect. Russian courts have set aside removal resolutions on these grounds, even where the underlying corporate will was clear. For foreign parent companies operating through a single-shareholder LLC — a common structure — procedural errors in convening the meeting can be avoided relatively easily; in multi-participant or JSC structures, the procedural requirements demand closer attention. Key risk points in CEO liability and removal for foreign shareholders are addressed in further detail at Key risk points in CEO liability and removal.

A distinct constraint arises in situations where the CEO is also a participant (shareholder) in the Russian entity. In such cases, the removal decision requires a majority of votes excluding — in limited circumstances — the vote of the participant being removed, but the precise rules depend on the charter and the type of entity. A CEO-participant who holds a blocking interest can create significant friction in removal proceedings, and external advice should be obtained before a removal resolution is put to the meeting in these circumstances.

The interaction between removal and employment law is also relevant. The CEO is both a corporate officer and an employee of the company under Russian employment law. Termination of the CEO's corporate authority does not automatically constitute a lawful termination of the employment relationship. The company must comply with Russian labour law requirements in terminating the employment agreement, which may include notice periods, compensation provisions, or specific grounds depending on the terms of the agreement. Failure to follow the employment law process in parallel with the corporate removal procedure exposes the company to an unfair dismissal claim before the general jurisdiction courts — a separate and parallel track from the corporate challenge in the arbitrazh courts.

§ V. Practical guidance for in-house counsel and foreign parent companies

Several recurrent issues arise in the governance of Russian subsidiaries that foreign parent companies can address proactively. First, the charter and internal regulations should be reviewed to ensure that the scope of the CEO's authority — and the approval thresholds for major transactions, related-party transactions, and disposals — is clearly defined and consistent with the parent company's internal approval framework. This review should include checking the EGRUL entry, because discrepancies between the registered position and the internal documents are a common source of disputes.

Second, the company should maintain governance records — board minutes, transaction approvals, management accounts — in a form that would support a future damages claim if one became necessary. This is not a counsel of pessimism; it is a standard element of corporate hygiene that has direct implications for the company's ability to recover losses from a CEO whose conduct later proves to have been harmful.

Third, when performance or conduct concerns arise, in-house counsel should take early advice on the Russian legal framework before initiating any formal process. The procedural requirements for valid removal are specific, and errors made early in the process — whether in convening the meeting, framing the resolution, or managing the registration step — can be difficult to correct without further cost and delay. The Corporate Governance practice at Vetrov & Partners advises foreign parent companies on each stage of this process.

Fourth, where the company has reason to believe that the CEO has caused it loss, the limitation clock and the documentation analysis should begin simultaneously. Waiting for the CEO to depart before commissioning a review of historical transactions is a common error; in some situations, the company is better served by initiating the review — and potentially the claim — while the CEO is still in post, using the leverage of formal proceedings to achieve a negotiated resolution.

For in-house counsel managing governance concerns at a Russian subsidiary — make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

Frequently asked questions

Q: What standard of care does Russian law apply to a CEO's decisions, and how does it differ from the business judgement rule?

A: Russian law requires the CEO to act in good faith and reasonably. Unlike the business judgement rule, which in US and UK practice creates a strong presumption in favour of managerial discretion, the Russian standard is applied retrospectively by the court, which examines whether the CEO had adequate grounds for the decision at the time and whether it fell within the range of commercially rational choices. The CEO cannot rely on the fact that a decision was made in good faith alone; the court will also assess whether the CEO gathered adequate information beforehand, whether they disclosed relevant conflicts, and whether the outcome was consistent with the company's interests. Companies with well-documented decision-making processes are better positioned to defend former officers against such claims.

Q: Can a foreign parent company be held liable for acts taken by the CEO of its Russian subsidiary?

A: The parent company is not automatically liable for the Russian subsidiary CEO's actions. However, parent company exposure arises in specific situations: where the parent company gave binding instructions to the subsidiary's CEO that caused the subsidiary to act against its own interests, or where the parent is found to have controlled the subsidiary's decisions in ways that constitute improper interference under Russian corporate legislation. In insolvency, the Russian legal framework allows insolvency administrators and creditors to pursue persons who controlled the debtor company — including foreign parent companies — for subsidiary liability (subsidiarnaya otvetstvennost). Foreign parent companies that issue direct operational instructions to the Russian CEO without a proper governance structure in place are at elevated risk of being characterised as controlling persons.

Q: What is the procedure for removing a CEO of a Russian entity, and can it be blocked by the CEO?

A: The general meeting or board — depending on the charter — adopts a removal resolution, which must meet the procedural requirements for valid convening, notice, quorum, and voting. The resolution takes effect from the date specified in it, but registration of the change in EGRUL is required to bind third parties. The CEO cannot unilaterally block a resolution that is procedurally valid, but they may challenge it in the arbitrazh court on procedural grounds or — less commonly — on substantive grounds if they allege the removal was made in abuse of rights. A successful challenge can set aside the resolution, restoring the CEO's authority pending a new meeting. The risk of challenge is highest where the company structure is complex, where the removal documentation is not in order, or where the CEO is also a participant with a significant stake.

Q: How long does a Russian company have to bring a damages claim against a former CEO?

A: The general limitation period is three years. The clock starts from the moment the company became aware — or should have become aware — of the CEO's breach and the resulting loss. Because of the discovery rule, the period may begin to run from the date of a new CEO's appointment or an audit that reveals the problem, rather than the date of the original transaction. This is a meaningful protection for companies that act promptly following a management change. However, it is not unlimited: courts apply the discovery rule carefully, and a company that had the means to discover a breach earlier may find its claim time-barred even if no formal review was conducted. Companies are advised to commission a governance review promptly after any CEO transition.

Q: Does the CEO's departure from Russia affect the company's ability to bring and enforce a damages claim?

A: The Russian arbitrazh court has jurisdiction over a claim against a former CEO regardless of whether the defendant is present in Russia at the time proceedings are initiated. The claim is brought at the court of the company's registered location. Service of process on a defendant outside Russia is governed by the applicable rules of civil procedure and, where available, mutual legal assistance arrangements. Obtaining a judgment is generally possible in the defendant's absence if service requirements are met. Enforcement, however, is a separate matter: a Russian court judgment against a CEO who holds assets only outside Russia will require recognition and enforcement proceedings in the relevant foreign jurisdiction. The practical enforceability of the judgment therefore depends on the asset location and the bilateral or multilateral framework between Russia and that jurisdiction.

Practitioner note

This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.

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