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Regulatory update: CEO liability and removal under Russian law against state unitary enterprises

Stanislav Lastovsky · September 2026 · 8 min read

CEO liability and removal rules for Russian state unitary enterprises changed in 2027. What in-house counsel must review now. Make an enquiry.

Amendments to Russian legislation governing state unitary enterprises that came into force in 2027 have materially altered the framework for CEO liability and removal within this distinct category of Russian legal entity. For foreign companies and their in-house counsel navigating Russian corporate structures — whether through joint arrangements with state-linked entities, supply relationships, or asset positions where a state unitary enterprise sits across the table — the changes carry direct operational implications. Under Russian corporate legislation, state unitary enterprises occupy a separate legal space from joint-stock companies and limited liability companies, and the rules governing their executive leadership have historically differed in ways that foreign counterparties often underestimate. This update sets out what changed, who is affected, and what in-house counsel should consider as a practical next step.

§ I. What changed: before and after the 2027 amendments

Before the amendments took effect, the framework for CEO liability and removal in Russian state unitary enterprises combined elements of Russian labour law and the specialised federal legislation on state and municipal unitary enterprises. The founder — typically a relevant ministry, regional government, or municipal authority — held broad discretion in appointing and removing the CEO, with limited procedural constraints on termination and a liability standard that applied general civil law principles of causation and loss. Crucially, under the pre-amendment framework, enforcement of liability claims against a CEO of a state unitary enterprise was primarily a matter for the founding public authority: private counterparties — including foreign creditors or contractual partners — had a narrower range of direct enforcement mechanisms available to them.

The 2027 amendments introduced several changes of practical significance. First, the liability standard for the CEO of a state unitary enterprise was expressly aligned — in material respects — with the standard applicable to directors of commercial companies under the general civil legislation on legal entities, reinforcing the duty to act reasonably and in good faith and lowering the evidentiary threshold for a founding authority or other entitled party to demonstrate a breach. Second, the amendments clarified and in certain respects expanded the categories of persons entitled to bring liability claims, introducing a more structured procedural pathway for state bodies acting in the public interest. Third, they codified grounds for mandatory removal — including specific triggers tied to financial performance thresholds and regulatory compliance failures — that had previously existed only at the level of internal regulation or executive instruction.

The practical effect of these changes is not cosmetic. Where previously the removal of a CEO of a state unitary enterprise was an administrative act whose procedural legitimacy was largely opaque to outside parties, the amended framework introduces a degree of structure — and therefore a degree of predictability — that may affect how foreign counterparties assess both risk and remedy when dealing with such entities.

"The 2027 amendments bring the liability standard for state unitary enterprise CEOs meaningfully closer to the commercial company framework — a shift that foreign counterparties and creditors dealing with these entities should not overlook." — Stanislav Lastovsky, Senior Lawyer, Practice Lead — Restructuring & Insolvency, Vetrov & Partners

§ II. Which foreign companies and counterparties are most affected?

The question of who is affected by these amendments is best answered by reference to the transaction or relationship type rather than the foreign company's jurisdiction alone.

Foreign companies acting as trade creditors, supply chain partners, or joint venture counterparties to Russian state unitary enterprises are most directly exposed. In practice, state unitary enterprises remain significant actors in sectors including infrastructure, utilities, defence-adjacent manufacturing, and municipal services across the Siberian and Ural federal districts, as well as in EAEU-adjacent cross-border transactions. Foreign companies with existing contractual relationships with such entities — or those considering entering them — will find that the amended liability and removal framework has implications for how they should assess counterparty risk, negotiate contractual protections, and respond to executive leadership changes during the life of a contract.

For in-house counsel managing a Russian subsidiary or a cross-border supply arrangement with a state unitary enterprise counterparty, the regulatory timeline creates a live due diligence obligation. Where a counterparty CEO has changed, or where there are signals of financial or regulatory distress at the state unitary enterprise level, the amended grounds for mandatory removal may have been triggered — and if so, the legal authority of interim or replacement leadership should be verified before further contractual commitments are made. Under Russian corporate legislation, acts taken by a person who was not validly appointed as CEO — or whose authority had lapsed following a removal event — may be challengeable.

Foreign minority shareholders in mixed-ownership structures that include a state unitary enterprise or its successor entity as a co-participant should also take note. While the minority shareholder position in a purely commercial Russian company is governed by a separate body of law, where the corporate structure includes a state unitary enterprise element — for example, as a result of conversion, reorganisation, or a joint venture vehicle — the amended rules on CEO liability and removal may intersect with the rights and remedies available to minority participants. The analysis is fact-specific and requires review of the applicable constitutional documents and the relevant corporate legislation in combination.

If your company has an existing contractual or structural relationship with a Russian state unitary enterprise, now is the appropriate moment to review the implications of the 2027 amendments — make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

§ III. What should foreign clients do now?

Three practical steps merit consideration for in-house counsel whose companies have Russian exposure involving state unitary enterprises.

First, audit counterparty leadership. Where a Russian state unitary enterprise is a contractual counterparty, verify that the current CEO's appointment and authority are validly constituted under the amended framework. The codification of mandatory removal grounds means that a CEO who would previously have remained in post pending an administrative decision may now have been removed by operation of law — or may be at risk of removal — without a formal public announcement that reaches foreign counterparties. Counterparty authority checks should be treated as a recurring governance step rather than a one-time diligence exercise.

Second, review contractual provisions on change of control and authority. Many standard commercial contracts with Russian entities contain representations about signing authority but do not address the specific risk of executive removal under the state unitary enterprise framework. The amended legislation provides a basis for reviewing whether existing contracts adequately protect a foreign counterparty against the consequences of a CEO removal event — including provisions on ratification of prior acts, notification obligations, and step-in or termination rights.

Third, assess any structural exposure in joint arrangements. For companies involved in joint ventures or reorganised entities that include a state unitary enterprise component, the interaction between the amended CEO liability rules and the minority shareholder protections available under Russian corporate legislation should be mapped. The firm's Corporate Governance practice has advised on the intersection of these frameworks in matters involving both conventional commercial entities and state-adjacent structures.

For further background on the general framework of CEO liability and removal in Russian law, see Key risk points in CEO liability and removal and The law and practice of CEO liability and removal in Russia.

For matters involving the Restructuring & Insolvency dimension — where a state unitary enterprise in financial distress is the counterparty — the analysis may additionally engage the insolvency framework and the firm's related practice.

Frequently asked questions

Q: What specifically changed in Russian law on CEO liability and removal for state unitary enterprises in 2027?

A: The 2027 amendments to the legislation governing Russian state unitary enterprises introduced three principal changes. They aligned the CEO liability standard more closely with the general civil law standard applicable to directors of commercial companies — requiring demonstration of failure to act reasonably and in good faith. They clarified and in certain respects expanded the categories of parties entitled to bring liability claims. And they codified specific mandatory grounds for removal, including performance and regulatory compliance triggers, that had previously existed only in administrative guidance or internal regulation. The combined effect is a more structured and, for outside parties, more predictable framework for CEO accountability within this category of Russian legal entity.

Q: Which foreign companies are most affected by the changes to CEO liability rules in Russian state unitary enterprises?

A: The changes are most directly relevant to foreign companies that are contractual counterparties of Russian state unitary enterprises — including trade creditors, infrastructure suppliers, and parties to long-term service or procurement arrangements. They are also relevant to foreign participants in joint ventures or reorganised structures where a state unitary enterprise is or was a co-participant, and to any company whose Russian operations depend on a state unitary enterprise for access to regulated infrastructure or licensing. In each case, the amended CEO liability and removal framework affects how counterparty authority should be assessed and what contractual protections are appropriate.

Q: What should in-house counsel do now in response to the Russian CEO liability update for state unitary enterprises?

A: The most immediate steps are: verify the current CEO's authority at any state unitary enterprise that is a counterparty — the codified mandatory removal grounds may have been triggered without public announcement; review existing contractual provisions for adequacy in addressing a CEO removal event; and, where joint venture or restructured entity exposure exists, map the interaction between the amended rules and applicable minority shareholder protections. These steps are best conducted with Russian-qualified counsel who can assess the specific constitutional documents and the applicable legislative framework in combination.

Practitioner note

This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.

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