Foreign subsidiaries face serious liability exposure when removing a CEO in Russia. Procedural errors can be costly and irreversible. Make an enquiry.
Unlike many common law systems, which treat director liability as a largely post-hoc remedy, Russian corporate law embeds it as an active structural risk throughout the life of the appointment. For in-house counsel managing a Russian subsidiary or joint venture, the decision to remove a CEO — or to respond to a CEO who has acted outside authority — triggers a sequence of procedural and liability steps that differ substantially from what home-jurisdiction practice would suggest. Getting that sequence right matters not only for the immediate transition but for the company's ability to recover losses and avoid exposing itself to counterclaims.
Before any formal step is taken — whether removal, investigation, or a claim for losses — in-house counsel should assemble the following:
The practical purpose of this checklist is to establish two things before proceedings begin: the precise scope of the CEO's authority under both corporate and employment law, and the factual record from which a losses claim can later be built if needed.
The starting point in any CEO liability or removal analysis under Russian corporate law is the governing documents of the entity. Russian law distinguishes between the CEO's role as a corporate officer — defined by the charter and corporate legislation — and as an employee, governed by the Labour Code. These two frameworks operate in parallel and create independent obligations.
The charter will specify which body is authorised to appoint and remove the CEO. In a limited liability company (OOO), this is typically the general meeting of participants, though the charter may delegate the power to a board of directors. In a joint-stock company (AO), the structure depends on whether the company has a supervisory board. International clients frequently encounter difficulties here when the charter has not been updated to reflect corporate restructuring, changes in the shareholder register, or amendments to Russian legislation. A removal effected by a body that does not have charter authority over the appointment is challengeable and may be voided.
The employment contract adds a further layer. Russian labour legislation treats the CEO as a special category of employee, affording specific protections that cannot simply be waived by corporate resolution. Early termination for reasons not expressly listed in the contract or in the Labour Code can expose the company to reinstatement claims and compensation liability.
If your Russian subsidiary's charter authority over the CEO has not been reviewed recently, a short governance audit is a sound first step. Make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |
The grounds for CEO removal under Russian law fall into two categories with different procedural and financial consequences. The first is discretionary removal — the corporate body simply resolves to terminate the appointment, with no requirement to establish cause. This is the least controversial route procedurally, but it carries the highest employment law cost: the CEO is typically entitled to a severance payment whose amount is set by the employment contract or, where the contract is silent, by the Labour Code's provisions on early termination of executive officers.
The second category is cause-based removal. Grounds include: material breach of duties, single gross violation of employment obligations, the CEO's own business being found to be competitive with the company's, or the commission of actions giving rise to loss of trust. Where cause is established and documented, the severance obligation may be reduced or eliminated — but the evidentiary threshold is high, and courts scrutinise the adequacy of the internal investigation.
A third route — used less frequently by foreign shareholders — is removal via judicial application. This is available where a minority participant holds at least ten per cent of the charter capital and can demonstrate that the CEO has caused the company loss or systematically violated the law. In practice, this route is slow and its outcome uncertain; it is more useful as leverage than as a primary strategy.
The practical choice between these routes is determined not only by the factual record but by the ownership structure, the relationship with any co-participants, and whether a subsequent losses claim is intended.
Once the route is selected, the formal corporate process must be followed precisely. The consequences of procedural error are significant: a removal resolution adopted in breach of quorum, notice, or voting requirements is voidable, and courts have set aside CEO removals on technical grounds in cases where the substantive decision was entirely justified.
The standard sequence for an OOO is: (a) convening notice served on all participants within the period specified in the charter, typically not less than thirty days before the meeting; (b) agenda including the specific item of CEO removal and, where relevant, appointment of a replacement; (c) quorum established and votes recorded in the meeting minutes; (d) minutes signed and certified in the manner required by the charter or by a notary, where notarisation of participant decisions is required; (e) registration of the change with the tax authority (which acts as the corporate register in Russia) within the statutory period, with the outgoing and incoming CEO details updated in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities (EGRUL).
The EGRUL registration step is operationally critical. Until the new CEO is registered, the outgoing CEO retains formal authority in relation to third parties — including banks, counterparties, and regulators — who are entitled to rely on the register. A gap between the corporate resolution and registration creates a window of risk that a departing CEO in a contentious departure can exploit.
For AOs, the process differs in form — the board of directors typically acts, and different notice and documentation requirements apply — but the logic is the same: the documented corporate process must be complete before any external step is taken.
For in-house counsel managing a contested or time-sensitive CEO removal, early legal support on the corporate process avoids the procedural errors that give rise to the most avoidable claims. Make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |
Under Russian corporate legislation, the CEO owes a duty to act in the interests of the company reasonably and in good faith. Where a court finds that the CEO failed to meet this standard, and that losses resulted, the CEO can be ordered to compensate those losses from personal assets. This applies to both current and former CEOs — a former officer remains personally exposed for acts committed during the period of office.
The losses claim is brought in the arbitrazh court (the Russian commercial court system) by the company itself, or by a participant holding the required minimum shareholding. For a foreign parent company managing a Russian subsidiary, the practical implication is that a post-removal losses claim is a corporate remedy available to the entity — not to the foreign shareholder directly, and not to the parent company for its own losses. Counsel advising a foreign parent sometimes overlooks this structural point, with consequences for how the claim is framed and who has standing to bring it.
Note: the general limitation period for losses claims against a director under Russian law is three years from the date the company or its participants knew, or should have known, of the violation and the person responsible. In practice, this clock often begins running from the date a new CEO first reviews the predecessor's decisions — meaning that delay in initiating a post-removal audit is not neutral. Companies that wait more than two years to investigate a departed CEO's conduct may find that limitation has become the principal obstacle.
The evidentiary burden on the claimant is to show: (a) the specific decisions or omissions that constitute the breach; (b) the fact and quantum of loss; and (c) the causal link between them. Russian courts have developed a substantial body of case law on this standard. In practice, claims that rely on broad assertions of mismanagement without documentary underpinning rarely succeed.
If your Russian subsidiary has recently changed its CEO, a structured post-removal review within the first twelve months preserves optionality on any losses claim. Make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |
The post-removal period presents distinct risks that in-house counsel should anticipate before the removal is executed, not after.
The most common is the counterclaim. A departing CEO who disputes the grounds for removal — particularly where cause is alleged — may bring claims for unfair dismissal, unpaid salary or bonus, and compensation for reputational damage. Russian labour courts are generally disposed to protect employee rights, and the CEO's dual status as both corporate officer and employee means these claims are not dismissed as meritless simply because the corporate process was formally correct.
A related risk is the transfer of company documents and seals. Russian law requires the outgoing CEO to transfer all corporate documents, accounting records, and company stamps to the successor. Where a departing CEO withholds records — whether as leverage or out of bad faith — the company must pursue a separate legal process to compel transfer. This has direct operational consequences: without access to historical contracts and accounting data, the new CEO cannot manage the business effectively, and any subsequent losses claim is impeded.
A further point for foreign parent companies: where the removed CEO was also an authorised signatory on bank accounts, the bank notification and signatory change must be completed independently of the EGRUL registration. Banks apply their own internal procedures and timelines, which can extend well beyond the corporate registration step.
The firm's Corporate Governance practice has advised foreign companies in a range of these post-removal situations, including cases involving contested exits, document recovery, and the structuring of losses claims. Related experience is also covered in our analysis of court practice on this topic: Court practice shift on CEO liability and removal in Russia and The law and practice of CEO liability and removal in Russia.
Q: Can a foreign parent company remove the CEO of its Russian subsidiary without shareholder meeting formalities?
A: No. Under Russian corporate law, the removal of a CEO must follow the procedure established in the company's charter and, for OOOs, by the law on limited liability companies. The authority to remove typically vests in the general meeting of participants or, where delegated, the board of directors. A decision taken outside that structure — even by a sole foreign participant acting informally — is challengeable as procedurally invalid. The corporate resolution must be documented, quorum must be established, and the change must be registered with the tax authority in the EGRUL. Where the company requires notarisation of participant decisions, the notary procedure must also be completed. Informal emails or internal instructions from the foreign parent are not sufficient.
Q: How long does the EGRUL registration of a CEO change take, and what are the practical risks during that period?
A: The standard registration period is five working days from submission of the required documents to the tax authority. In practice, processing times may extend where the application contains errors or where the local tax office requests additional verification. During the interval between the corporate resolution and EGRUL registration, the outgoing CEO retains formal legal authority in the eyes of third parties, including counterparties and banks, who are entitled to rely on the registered information. This creates a window of operational risk. Where a CEO departure is contentious, it is advisable to take precautionary steps — such as notifying key counterparties and banks of the forthcoming change in advance of registration, and revoking any individual powers of attorney — to limit the scope for the outgoing CEO to act in that window.
Q: Is it possible to pursue the former CEO personally for losses caused before removal?
A: Yes. Russian corporate legislation provides a direct route to claim compensation from a former CEO for losses caused by breach of the duty to act reasonably and in good faith. The claim is brought in the arbitrazh court, typically by the company itself, and must establish the specific decisions or omissions that constituted the breach, the fact and quantum of the resulting loss, and the causal connection between them. The limitation period is three years from the date the company or its participants became aware — or should have become aware — of the violation and the identity of the person responsible. In practice, this means that the longer a new CEO waits before reviewing a predecessor's decisions, the greater the risk that limitation narrows or forecloses the claim.
This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.
Our team advises foreign clients on exactly these questions across Russia and the EAEU region. Initial 30-minute consultation — complimentary.
Make an enquiry