Novosibirsk · Russian-qualified counsel Recognised by Pravo-300 · Best Lawyers · Kommersant
Corporate & Regulatory

CEO liability and removal under Russian law against state unitary enterprises: what in-house counsel need to know

Stanislav Lastovsky · October 2026 · 12 min read

State unitary enterprises apply distinct Russian rules on CEO liability and removal. What GCs at foreign investors must plan for. Make an enquiry.

Unlike the position familiar to most in-house counsel from English, German, or Dutch corporate law, the removal and liability exposure of a chief executive in a Russian state unitary enterprise (GUP – gosudarstvennoye unitarnoye predpriyatiye) is not governed by the corporate statutes that apply to limited liability companies or joint-stock companies. For foreign investors, joint venture partners, and creditors dealing with a GUP counterparty in Russia, the governance architecture is materially different: the proprietary interest in the enterprise's assets remains with the state (federal or regional), the CEO is appointed and removed through administrative channels as much as corporate ones, and the liability regime for losses draws on both civil and labour law simultaneously. This guide sets out the key steps in-house counsel must follow when assessing, managing, or initiating CEO removal or liability proceedings against a Russian state unitary enterprise.

What to prepare before taking any action

Before initiating any step, assemble the following documents and information. Gaps in this list typically delay proceedings by several months and create procedural vulnerabilities that the opposing party or the founding authority will exploit.

Note: in Russian state unitary enterprises, the founding authority – not the enterprise itself – is formally the employer of the CEO. Liability claims that are directed at the enterprise as an entity, rather than at the founding authority channel, frequently fail on standing grounds at first instance.

Step 1 – Identify the founding authority and confirm its current mandate

The foundational step in any CEO liability or removal matter involving a Russian GUP is identifying which government body holds the founding authority (uchreditel') role and confirming whether that body still exists in its current form. Russian administrative reorganisations have, in a number of instances, transferred the founding authority function between ministries, regional departments, or municipal bodies without a corresponding amendment to the GUP's charter. Proceeding against the wrong authority produces procedurally defective instruments.

Check the unified register of state enterprises (USRP) entry for the GUP – this records the founding authority. Cross-reference it against the current structure of the relevant ministry or regional administration using the official portal of the relevant level of government. If the founding authority has been reorganised or merged, obtain the legal succession document before any formal step.

For in-house counsel at a foreign entity with contractual exposure to the GUP, this step is equally relevant when assessing whether management changes at the GUP will affect the counterparty's authority to perform or novate existing obligations. A change of founding authority without charter amendment can create a window during which the GUP's authority to sign is disputed.

If your organisation has exposure to a Russian GUP and a change of management is anticipated, make an enquiry before the transition occurs: info@vetrovpartners.com |

Step 2 – Analyse the grounds for removal under the applicable regime

CEO removal in a Russian GUP operates across three distinct legal channels, and the available grounds differ materially by channel. Confusing them is the most common error in early-stage instructions received from foreign counsel.

The first channel is the administrative discretion of the founding authority. Under the legislation governing state and municipal unitary enterprises in Russia, the founding authority retains an unconditional right to terminate the director's appointment. Unlike the position in LLC or JSC law, there is no requirement to establish cause. The founding authority may act at will, subject to the applicable labour law obligations on notice and severance.

The second channel is termination for cause under the labour contract and the Labour Code of the Russian Federation. Specific grounds include failure to perform duties, causing loss to the enterprise, or the calling of an extraordinary general meeting (by analogy) of the founding authority. Termination for cause under the labour contract requires documentary substantiation and, if challenged, is subject to reinstatement claims before the court of general jurisdiction.

The third channel is removal as a consequence of a liability judgment. Where civil liability proceedings against the CEO are initiated by the founding authority – or, in insolvency, by the bankruptcy trustee – a judgment finding the director personally liable may form the basis for a termination instrument, though the two proceedings are legally independent.

For in-house counsel advising a foreign shareholder or creditor in a joint-structure involving a GUP, the practically relevant question is whether the founding authority has been persuaded or is legally required to act. The authority's inertia is common; the mechanisms for compelling it to act are limited.

How does CEO liability under Russian GUP law differ from liability in a standard Russian LLC?

CEO liability in a GUP is determined using a similar negligence-adjacent standard as in LLC law – the director is expected to act reasonably and in good faith in the interests of the enterprise. However, several structural differences make the liability exposure in a GUP more constrained in practice.

First, the founding authority retains ownership of the enterprise's assets, and many material transactions require the founding authority's prior consent. A director who exceeds authority on a transaction that required but did not receive that consent may face liability – but courts have on occasion attributed responsibility to the founding authority itself where the prior consent process was inadequately structured.

Second, the GUP does not have shareholders in the corporate sense. There is no body equivalent to a general meeting capable of passing a resolution to pursue the director independently of the founding authority. The founding authority both controls the enterprise and acts as the exclusive decision-maker on liability. This concentration means that where the founding authority itself is complicit in or indifferent to the conduct that caused loss, litigation is effectively blocked at first instance.

Third, and relevant for creditors, the founding authority bears subsidiary liability for the GUP's obligations where the GUP's property is insufficient to satisfy a judgment creditor. This subsidiary liability route is procedurally demanding but has succeeded in a number of documented matters where the founding authority's instructions caused the GUP to assume obligations it could not service.

Step 3 – Assess the labour law constraints on removal procedure

Regardless of the substantive grounds chosen, every CEO removal in a Russian GUP must comply with the labour law obligations that attach to the employment relationship between the founding authority and the director. This procedural layer is frequently underestimated by counsel focused on the corporate or administrative dimension.

Key requirements include: the issuance of a formal instrument of termination by an authorised officer of the founding authority (not the enterprise itself); compliance with the notice period specified in the labour contract or, in the absence of such a provision, the statutory minimum; and, for terminations without cause under administrative discretion, the payment of the severance compensation established in the labour contract or, where not established, the statutory minimum under the Labour Code.

Note: where the founding authority proceeds with termination without satisfying the labour law requirements, the director is entitled to apply to a court of general jurisdiction for reinstatement, back pay, and compensation for non-pecuniary harm. In practice, Russian courts have reinstated GUP directors in cases where the founding authority's termination instrument was formally defective – for example, where it was signed by an officer who did not hold the authority to bind the founding authority on employment decisions. For in-house counsel advising a party seeking removal, the formal quality of the termination instrument is as important as the substantive grounds.

Step 4 – Initiate and document the liability claim correctly

Where the objective is not merely removal but the recovery of losses from the outgoing or current CEO, the liability claim requires a distinct procedural pathway from the termination. These are parallel proceedings, not sequential, and initiating them in the wrong order or forum creates both procedural risk and limitation exposure.

Liability claims against a GUP director are brought in the commercial courts (arbitrazh courts) where the claimant is the enterprise itself or an entity acting in its interests, including a bankruptcy trustee in insolvency. Claims characterised as employment-related – for example, arising from a breach of the labour contract rather than a breach of fiduciary-type duty – are heard by courts of general jurisdiction. The forum question is determined by the legal characterisation of the claim, and mis-characterisation produces inadmissibility rather than a referral.

The substantive burden requires the claimant to establish: the existence of a loss suffered by the enterprise; a causal link between the director's specific acts or omissions and that loss; and the absence of circumstances justifying the director's conduct (for example, the prior consent or instruction of the founding authority). Quantification evidence – accounting reports, third-party valuations, transactional records – must be secured before filing because Russian arbitrazh courts do not typically grant wide pre-trial discovery orders.

For in-house counsel managing a matter involving director liability in a Russian GUP, early procedural preparation significantly affects the prospects of recovery. Make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

Step 5 – Manage the post-removal transition and protect counterparty interests

Removal of a GUP director without immediate appointment of a successor creates a period of governance uncertainty that can affect the validity of acts taken in the GUP's name. Under Russian law, the founding authority must appoint either a new permanent director or an acting director (ispolnyayushchiy obyazannosti) in parallel with or immediately following the termination. The gap between termination and appointment is a period of practical risk: contracts, payment orders, and other instruments signed during this gap may be challenged on authority grounds.

For a foreign counterparty to the GUP, the practical implication is straightforward: request a copy of the founding authority's appointment instrument for any new or acting director before executing any further obligations under existing contracts. Do not rely solely on the GUP's own confirmation of its management position. Verify through the unified register entry and, if time permits, through the founding authority's official public communications.

Where the removal is contested and reinstatement proceedings are underway, the position of any acting director appointed in the interim is uncertain. Instruments of material significance executed by an acting director during contested removal proceedings should be treated with caution and, where possible, deferred until the reinstatement question is resolved.

For in-house counsel at a foreign entity that is a creditor, joint venture partner, or contractual counterparty to a Russian GUP, a review of the corporate governance arrangements and the specific provisions of the GUP's charter before any management transition is the most effective risk-mitigation step available. The court practice on CEO liability and removal in Russian entities and the substantive law framework on CEO liability and removal provide additional context on how Russian courts have interpreted these obligations in contested matters.

Under Russian insolvency legislation, preferential transfer claims may be brought against a director for transactions completed up to three years before the bankruptcy filing – a window that creditors and counterparties dealing with financially stressed GUPs should account for when assessing historical transactions.

Frequently asked questions

Q: Can a foreign shareholder or creditor directly compel the removal of a GUP director in Russia?

A: No. In a Russian state unitary enterprise, only the founding authority – the government body that established the GUP – has the formal power to appoint and remove the director. A foreign creditor or joint venture partner has no direct legal standing to initiate removal proceedings. The available routes for a foreign party are indirect: applying to a court to recognise director liability, filing a complaint with the founding authority, or, in insolvency, relying on the bankruptcy trustee to seek removal as part of insolvency management. The practical constraint is that the founding authority's willingness to act is often determinative, and that willingness cannot be compelled except through formal judicial findings of loss attributable to the director's conduct.

Q: What documents are needed to support a CEO liability claim against a GUP director in Russian court?

A: A successful liability claim in the arbitrazh court requires, at minimum: evidence establishing the loss suffered by the enterprise (financial statements, audit reports, or transactional records); documents establishing the director's authority and the scope of his or her duties at the relevant time (the charter, the labour contract, and any founding authority instructions); evidence of the specific acts or omissions constituting the breach; and, where the founding authority's prior consent was or was not given for the impugned transaction, the relevant consent or refusal instrument. Courts will scrutinise the causal link between the director's conduct and the quantified loss. Evidence of the founding authority's own instructions or inaction is relevant and frequently adduced by the director as a defence.

Q: How long does a typical CEO removal or liability proceeding against a GUP director take in Russia?

A: An uncontested administrative removal by the founding authority can be effected within days if the decision is made and the documentation is prepared. Contested removal proceedings – where the director challenges the termination in a court of general jurisdiction – typically take between six months and eighteen months at first instance, with further delay if the matter proceeds to appeal. Civil liability proceedings in the arbitrazh court have a broadly similar first-instance timeline, depending on the complexity of the quantification evidence and whether the founding authority is joined as a party. For in-house counsel planning a managed transition, the practical advice is to assume a minimum six-to-twelve-month window for any contested element, and to sequence the administrative removal and the liability claim in parallel rather than consecutively.

Practitioner note

This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.

Facing a matter like this?

Our team advises foreign clients on exactly these questions across Russia and the EAEU region. Initial 30-minute consultation — complimentary.

Make an enquiry