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Restructuring & Insolvency

Russian arbitrazh court on Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawbacks under Russian law under Article 61.11 of the Insolvency Law: key takeaways

Stanislav Lastovsky · July 2026 · 7 min read

Russian arbitrazh courts are tightening preferential clawback rules under Article 61.11. What foreign creditors need to know. Make an enquiry.

In advising foreign creditors in Russian insolvency proceedings over recent years, one recurring source of surprise has been the interaction between two distinct avoidance regimes — the Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawback and the subsidiary liability mechanism under Article 61.11 of the Insolvency Law. A recent arbitrazh court decision has clarified how these two instruments operate when a creditor who received a preferential payment becomes the subject of both an avoidance claim and a parallel subsidiary liability proceeding. The ruling repays careful attention from any foreign party holding or expecting to hold a claim in Russian insolvency proceedings.

Background

Russian insolvency legislation provides two mechanisms that can operate against a creditor who received payment from a distressed debtor shortly before or after bankruptcy commenced. The first is the Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawback — a tool available to the insolvency manager to reverse payments that gave one creditor an advantage over others within defined lookback periods. The second is the subsidiary liability regime under Article 61.11 of the Insolvency Law, which concerns the personal liability of controlling persons whose decisions caused or materially contributed to the debtor's insolvency.

The question before the court was whether, and how, a completed Article 61.3 clawback — one in which the creditor had already returned the preferential payment and been re-registered in the creditor register — affected the calculation of harm to the creditor mass for the purposes of an Article 61.11 subsidiary liability claim against the debtor's controlling persons. The proceedings arose in the context of a trading company's insolvency, in which the insolvency manager had successfully reversed multiple preferential payments and subsequently brought an Article 61.11 claim against the company's former directors.

The matter engaged the Restructuring & Insolvency practice in its most complex form: a foreign trade creditor had received a pre-bankruptcy payment from the Russian debtor, been subject to a successful clawback, and then found itself entangled in the subsidiary liability proceedings as an interested party — with the court's analysis of the clawback directly affecting the quantum of the Article 61.11 award it sought to enforce against the controlling persons.

The decision

The arbitrazh court held, in summary, that a successfully completed Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawback does not automatically reduce the aggregate harm figure used to calculate a controlling person's Article 61.11 liability. The court's reasoning turned on a distinction between the harm caused to the creditor mass by the controlling persons' conduct — which crystallised at the point of the acts or omissions that led to insolvency — and the subsequent remedial effect of the avoidance proceedings, which restored funds to the estate but did not retroactively eliminate the harm that the preferential payments had, at the time of their making, inflicted on the body of creditors.

Put differently, the court treated the clawback recovery as a credit against the estate's deficit, to be applied when calculating the actual shortfall at the point of distribution, rather than as a deduction from the harm figure in the Article 61.11 proceedings. The practical effect was that the controlling persons remained exposed to the full Article 61.11 liability quantum, subject to adjustment only at the distribution stage once the insolvency estate's actual composition was confirmed.

"The court's approach to harm quantification in Article 61.11 proceedings — treating avoidance recoveries as distribution-stage credits rather than liability-reducing events — has material consequences for any creditor seeking to maximise recovery through the subsidiary liability route." — Stanislav Lastovsky, Senior Lawyer, Practice Lead — Restructuring & Insolvency, Vetrov & Partners

The court also addressed a secondary question: whether the foreign trade creditor's re-registration in the creditor register — following its return of the preferential payment — entitled it to participate as a full voting creditor in the committee proceedings that approved the Article 61.11 claim. The court confirmed that re-registration restores the creditor's position as if the preferential payment had not been made, and accordingly the creditor's vote on the decision to pursue Article 61.11 proceedings was valid.

If your company has received a payment from a Russian counterparty now subject to insolvency proceedings, and you are uncertain whether an Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawback claim may follow — make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

What this means for foreign creditors

The ruling carries three practical implications for foreign creditors with exposure to Russian insolvency proceedings.

First, foreign creditors who have received pre-bankruptcy payments from Russian counterparties — and who face or anticipate an Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawback claim under Russian law — should not assume that returning the payment and being re-registered in the creditor register ends their involvement. The same payment may be referenced in Article 61.11 subsidiary liability proceedings as part of the harm quantification analysis, and the creditor may need to participate in those proceedings as an interested party to protect its position on the quantum calculation.

Second, foreign creditors who are active claimants — seeking recovery through an Article 61.11 subsidiary liability award against controlling persons — should understand that avoidance recoveries already credited to the estate are unlikely to reduce the headline Article 61.11 quantum at the claim stage. The court's approach, as articulated in this decision, supports a creditor-favourable framing of the harm figure, subject to final adjustment at distribution. This is a meaningful tactical point when negotiating the scope and timing of a creditor committee vote on pursuing controlling persons.

Third, the decision reinforces the importance of acting quickly once a Russian counterparty files for insolvency. Creditors who delay engaging with proceedings miss the window to influence whether and how the insolvency manager pursues preferential transaction clawbacks, and risk finding themselves on the wrong side of those claims without having had an opportunity to contest the characterisation of the payment. Foreign creditors who allow the clawback claim to proceed uncontested may find that the subsequent subsidiary liability proceedings proceed on a factual record that has been set without their input.

For creditors advised by firms without direct experience in Russian insolvency proceedings, the interaction between Article 61.3 and Article 61.11 of the Insolvency Law is precisely the kind of procedural complexity that can be misread as a purely domestic Russian matter. In practice, it is frequently the most consequential element of a cross-border recovery strategy. Firms seeking Russian local counsel for active Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawback proceedings are encouraged to review our Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawbacks: a practitioner's guide for an overview of the claims process, and our legislative update on amendments affecting Article 61.3 preferential transactions for the current statutory position.

Creditors who delay initiating engagement with the insolvency manager risk losing the ability to contest a preferential clawback characterisation — a position that may then be used against them in the Article 61.11 subsidiary liability proceedings that follow.

For foreign creditors navigating an active Russian insolvency — or assessing exposure to an Article 61.3 claim — speak to our team: info@vetrovpartners.com |

Frequently asked questions

Q: What does this ruling change?

A: The decision clarifies that a successful Article 61.3 preferential transaction clawback — where the creditor returns the payment and is re-registered in the creditor register — does not reduce the quantum of harm used to calculate a controlling person's Article 61.11 subsidiary liability. Russian arbitrazh courts have generally treated avoidance recoveries as credits to be applied at the distribution stage, not as deductions from the liability figure established in the subsidiary liability proceedings. For foreign creditors, this means that an Article 61.11 claim against controlling persons retains its full quantitative scope even where the insolvency manager has already recovered funds through preferential clawback proceedings. The ruling also confirms that a creditor who returns a preferential payment and is re-registered is entitled to vote on creditor committee decisions, including the approval of Article 61.11 proceedings.

Q: What should foreign companies do in light of this decision?

A: Foreign creditors who have received payments from a Russian counterparty within the Article 61.3 lookback periods — typically one month for unconditional preferences and six months where knowledge of the debtor's insolvency can be established — should take immediate steps to assess their exposure to a clawback claim. If bankruptcy has already commenced, engaging Russian insolvency counsel promptly is the priority: the creditor's ability to contest the preferential characterisation of a payment depends on early participation in the proceedings. For creditors pursuing recovery through Article 61.11 subsidiary liability claims, the ruling provides a basis for resisting any argument by controlling persons that avoidance recoveries should reduce the aggregate harm figure at the claim stage. Foreign companies should also review any credits, set-off arrangements, or security enforcement actions taken in the period prior to the debtor's insolvency filing, as these may be subject to separate avoidance analysis under Russian insolvency legislation.

Practitioner note

This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.

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