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Restructuring & Insolvency

Deep dive: Article 61.2 transaction challenges in Russian insolvency

Stanislav Lastovsky · February 2026 · 13 min read

Russian courts can unwind transactions up to three years before a bankruptcy filing. What foreign creditors need to know now. Make an enquiry.

When a foreign creditor discovers that its Russian counterparty has entered insolvency proceedings, the first instinct is often to file a proof of claim and await distribution. That instinct may be reasonable in a German or Dutch insolvency. In a Russian one, it can be catastrophic. The mechanism that most frequently blindsides foreign claimants is the Article 61.2 transaction challenge: a statutory power granted to the insolvency administrator and qualifying creditors to unwind transactions completed before the bankruptcy filing, sometimes years earlier, and to reclaim value for the estate. For foreign companies that concluded supply agreements, received repayments, or transferred assets to or from a Russian entity now in insolvency, the exposure runs in both directions — as a potential respondent to a challenge and as a creditor whose ability to recover depends on the estate successfully unwinding preferential payments made to others.

§ I. What Article 61.2 does — and why foreign creditors cannot ignore it

Article 61.2 of the Russian Insolvency Law establishes two distinct categories of challengeable transaction. The first covers transactions concluded at an undervalue: where the consideration received by the debtor was materially below market, or where the transaction imposed an obligation on the debtor disproportionate to what was received in return. The second covers transactions that are characterised as made with the purpose of causing harm to creditors — what Russian insolvency practice terms a "prejudicial transaction" or a "harmful intent" challenge. These two categories have different look-back windows, different evidential burdens, and different consequences for the parties on the receiving end.

What makes Article 61.2 strategically significant for foreign creditors engaged with Russian entities is the breadth of what can be challenged. Russian insolvency legislation does not limit challengeable transactions to formal transfers of title. Loan repayments, security releases, set-off arrangements, dividend payments, and contractual settlements have all been successfully challenged under this provision. A foreign trade creditor that received repayment of a long-standing debt from a Russian counterparty six months before that counterparty filed for insolvency may find itself facing a claim to return the full payment to the insolvency estate — and then standing in line as an unsecured creditor for a fraction of the original amount.

The Restructuring & Insolvency practice at Vetrov & Partners acts on both sides of these proceedings: advising creditors on the exposure arising from payments received, and advising creditor coalitions seeking to use Article 61.2 challenges to reverse preferential payments made to insiders.

If your company has received payments from, or transferred assets to, a Russian entity now in insolvency proceedings — make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

§ II. How the look-back windows work — and what creditors frequently underestimate

The look-back period under Article 61.2 is one of the provision's most frequently misunderstood features. For undervalue transactions, the look-back window extends one year before the bankruptcy petition was filed. For prejudicial transactions — those where the purpose of harm to creditors can be established and the counterparty knew or should have known of the debtor's financial distress — the window extends to three years before the filing date. Under Russian insolvency legislation, preferential transfer claims may be brought for transactions completed up to three years before the bankruptcy filing: a window that creditors unfamiliar with Russian law consistently underestimate, particularly when the insolvency was filed long after the counterparty's financial difficulties became evident.

This matters acutely for foreign creditors because the "should have known" standard for counterparty knowledge is interpreted broadly in practice. Russian courts have applied a presumption that a counterparty dealing with a company in evident financial difficulty — one with unpaid tax obligations, overdue payables reported in publicly available filings, or a deteriorating credit position — had constructive knowledge of that distress. A foreign counterparty that argues it had no visibility into a Russian entity's financial health, because it relied on management representations or standard contractual warranties, is unlikely to succeed on that ground alone.

The Russian Supreme Court's clarification on Article 61.2 has refined the evidential framework that courts apply when assessing counterparty knowledge, and the current position makes passive reliance on contractual representations a weak defence. Foreign counterparties are expected to conduct proportionate due diligence — and in practice, the adequacy of that diligence is assessed with hindsight.

"The three-year look-back window under Article 61.2 catches foreign creditors who assumed their transaction was safely concluded. In practice, the date of the bankruptcy filing is the starting point — not the date of visible distress." — Stanislav Lastovsky, Senior Lawyer, Practice Lead — Restructuring & Insolvency, Vetrov & Partners

§ III. The purpose-of-harm test — what courts actually examine

The prejudicial transaction category under Article 61.2 requires the insolvency administrator or challenging creditor to demonstrate three elements: first, that the transaction was concluded within the three-year look-back period; second, that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transaction, or became insolvent as a result of it; and third, that the purpose of the transaction was to cause harm to creditors, and that the counterparty knew or should have known of that purpose.

In practice, Russian courts assess the purpose-of-harm element not by reference to subjective intent but by reference to objective indicators. Transactions that resulted in the debtor relinquishing a material asset below market value, discharging a related-party debt in preference to arm's-length creditors, or releasing security without adequate consideration have all been characterised as having a harmful purpose without any inquiry into whether the directors of the debtor subjectively intended to harm creditors. The harmful outcome, combined with knowledge of financial distress, is typically sufficient.

For foreign creditors, the practical consequence is that transactions with Russian counterparties that were entered into in good faith and at arm's-length terms may still be challenged if the counterparty was in financial difficulty at the time and the transaction resulted in a reduction of the estate available to other creditors. The "arm's-length" defence — while relevant — is not conclusive. Russian courts weigh it alongside the overall financial position of the debtor and the relative size of the transaction against the estate.

One category of transaction that consistently attracts challenge is the repayment of intercompany loans from a Russian subsidiary to its foreign parent. Where the parent holds a financial interest in the subsidiary, Russian courts have applied a presumption that the parent was aware of the subsidiary's financial position — and a loan repayment made in the period of distress is, on its face, a transaction that reduced the estate to the detriment of arm's-length creditors. Foreign corporate groups with Russian subsidiaries should treat any intercompany payment made in the two to three years before the subsidiary's insolvency as a potential Article 61.2 target.

§ IV. What does the cross-border dimension change for foreign claimants?

Foreign creditors face two distinct Article 61.2 risks: the risk of being the respondent to a challenge (having received payment or assets that the administrator seeks to recover), and the risk that transactions benefiting insiders or related parties were not challenged, depleting the estate before the foreign creditor's claim is satisfied. The cross-border dimension complicates both.

As a respondent to an Article 61.2 challenge, a foreign company is subject to the jurisdiction of the Russian arbitrazh court handling the insolvency. Russian insolvency courts have asserted jurisdiction over foreign counterparties to challengeable transactions, particularly where the underlying contract was governed by Russian law or the performance took place in Russia. A foreign company that ignores an Article 61.2 claim on the basis that the Russian court has no jurisdiction over it takes a considerable risk: default judgments in Russian insolvency proceedings can form the basis of enforcement claims in jurisdictions where the foreign company holds assets, and the enforceability of such judgments — while contested in many jurisdictions — is not zero. Legal advice from cross-border disputes counsel experienced in Russian enforcement is essential before any decision is made not to engage.

As a claimant creditor, a foreign company seeking to prompt the insolvency administrator to bring Article 61.2 challenges against third parties — or to bring such challenges itself as a qualifying creditor — faces the procedural complexity of Russian creditors' meetings, committee voting, and the administrator's discretion. The insolvency administrator has wide discretion over which transactions to challenge, and that discretion is susceptible to conflicts of interest where the administrator was appointed at the debtor's initiative. Foreign creditors who wish to have a real influence on challenge strategy must act promptly to establish their position in the creditor registry and, where possible, secure representation on the creditors' committee.

For a detailed account of how the firm has acted in creditor-side Article 61.2 mandates, see the firm's Matters Hub.

For foreign creditors assessing Article 61.2 exposure or seeking to instruct Russian insolvency counsel — make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

§ V. What should foreign creditors do in practice?

Practical guidance on Article 61.2 exposure falls into two timelines: before insolvency is filed, and after.

Before a Russian counterparty files for insolvency, the priority for foreign creditors is documentation. Every material transaction — loan repayment, asset transfer, security release, contractual settlement — should be documented with a contemporaneous record of the market valuation basis, the counterparty's financial position as assessed at the time, and the commercial rationale. Where the counterparty showed signs of financial difficulty, due diligence records should demonstrate that the foreign creditor assessed those signs and concluded (with reasoned basis) that the transaction was nonetheless at arm's length. This documentation does not eliminate challenge risk, but it significantly narrows the evidential gap that an administrator can exploit.

After a Russian counterparty files for insolvency, the priority is speed. The window for filing a proof of claim and attending the first creditors' meeting is short under Russian procedure, and absent creditors lose influence over administrator decisions — including decisions about which Article 61.2 challenges to pursue. Foreign creditors should also instruct Russian counsel to conduct an immediate review of all transactions with the now-insolvent entity over the preceding three years, identifying which, if any, may attract a challenge and assessing the strength of available defences. Early analysis allows the creditor to take a position — whether to contest, to negotiate a settlement with the administrator, or to seek to minimise exposure through procedural means — before the administrator moves first.

Where a foreign creditor is both a potential respondent (having received payments) and a registered claimant creditor, the conflict between those positions requires careful management. In some cases, a creditor in that position may prefer to acknowledge the vulnerability of a received payment and negotiate a voluntary return on favourable terms, thereby preserving its standing as a creditor in good standing rather than facing a contested claim with adverse costs.

For a procedural overview of how Article 61.2 challenges are initiated and contested, see Navigating Article 61.2 transaction challenges.

Creditors who delay establishing their position in Russian insolvency proceedings risk losing both the ability to influence administrator decisions and priority in distribution. Discuss your matter in confidence: info@vetrovpartners.com |

Frequently asked questions

Q: What is the look-back period for an Article 61.2 challenge in Russian insolvency?

A: Under Russian insolvency legislation, the look-back period depends on the type of transaction being challenged. For undervalue transactions — where the consideration received by the debtor was materially below market — the window is one year before the bankruptcy petition was filed. For prejudicial transactions, where the purpose of the transaction was to cause harm to creditors and the counterparty knew or should have known of the debtor's financial distress, the window extends to three years before the filing date. Foreign creditors often underestimate this window, particularly where the Russian entity's financial deterioration was gradual and the insolvency filing came some time after the point of visible distress. The starting point is the date the petition was filed, not the date of the debtor's financial difficulties.

Q: Can a foreign company be required to appear in a Russian insolvency court in an Article 61.2 challenge?

A: Yes. Russian arbitrazh courts handling insolvency proceedings have asserted jurisdiction over foreign counterparties to challengeable transactions, particularly where the underlying contract was governed by Russian law or where the transaction was performed in Russia. A foreign company that receives notice of an Article 61.2 claim and chooses not to engage — on the basis that the Russian court lacks jurisdiction over it — risks a default judgment that may subsequently form the basis of enforcement proceedings in jurisdictions where the foreign company holds assets. Whether such a judgment would be enforced by a foreign court depends on the bilateral recognition framework in place. The practical advice is to engage with the proceedings and contest jurisdiction on the merits, rather than to ignore them.

Q: What is the "purpose of harm" test and how do Russian courts apply it?

A: The purpose-of-harm test is the core of the prejudicial transaction challenge under Article 61.2. Courts assess it not by reference to subjective intention but by examining objective indicators: whether the transaction resulted in the debtor relinquishing a material asset below market value, discharging related-party debt in preference to arm's-length creditors, or releasing security without adequate consideration. Where these objective indicators are present, and the debtor was in financial difficulty at the time of the transaction, courts have characterised the transaction as harmful in purpose without inquiring into the directors' subjective state of mind. A foreign counterparty's good faith does not, of itself, defeat the challenge — though it is a relevant factor in assessing whether the counterparty "knew or should have known" of the debtor's distress.

Q: What defences are available to a foreign company facing an Article 61.2 challenge?

A: The principal defences are: first, that the transaction was concluded at arm's length and for fair market consideration (displacing the undervalue element); second, that the foreign company had no actual or constructive knowledge of the debtor's financial distress at the time of the transaction; and third, that the transaction did not in fact cause harm to the general body of creditors, because the estate was not diminished as a result. Each of these defences requires contemporaneous documentation — valuation records, due diligence materials, correspondence demonstrating the commercial rationale. Where the transaction involved an intercompany payment between a Russian subsidiary and its foreign parent, the first two defences are harder to establish, given the presumption courts apply that related parties had visibility into the subsidiary's financial position. Early engagement of Russian insolvency counsel, before any formal challenge is filed, is advisable.

Q: Can a foreign creditor bring an Article 61.2 challenge itself, or must it rely on the insolvency administrator?

A: Under Russian insolvency legislation, the primary authority to bring an Article 61.2 challenge rests with the insolvency administrator. However, qualifying creditors — those who have filed a proof of claim and whose debt has been included in the creditor registry — may bring a challenge themselves in certain circumstances, particularly where the administrator declines to act or where a relevant conflict of interest is evident. The threshold for qualifying creditors to bring their own challenge requires a minimum percentage of the total creditor debt represented in the registry. In practice, foreign creditors seeking to have Article 61.2 challenges pursued against insider transactions must establish their position in the registry promptly, attend creditors' meetings, and where possible secure representation on the creditors' committee to influence the administrator's decisions.

Practitioner note

This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.

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