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Russian court practice on exit tax obligations on departure from Russia for Emirati-owned Russian groups: 2027 update

Kristina Kornouhova · September 2026 · 10 min read

Russian courts have clarified exit tax obligations for Emirati-owned Russian groups. Key shifts in-house counsel needs to assess. Make an enquiry.

The landscape governing exit tax obligations in Russia for Emirati-owned Russian groups shifted materially in the period leading into 2027. As Russian courts have increasingly addressed disputes brought by the Federal Tax Service against departing corporate structures, the previously uncertain contours of the exit tax framework have acquired sharper definition — with significant consequences for in-house counsel at UAE-linked entities managing Russian asset portfolios. This update summarises the principal developments and their practical implications for group structures with Emirati beneficial ownership.

§ I. What changed — the before and after of exit tax obligations in Russia for Emirati-owned groups

Until the legislative and judicial developments that accelerated through 2026 and into 2027, the application of Russian exit tax obligations to groups with Emirati beneficial ownership occupied a contested middle ground. The Russia–UAE double tax agreement, while providing treaty protection in several categories of income, left substantive uncertainty regarding the triggering events for exit tax where Russian legal entities were restructured or where controlling participations were transferred as part of a departure from the Russian market.

The prevailing approach prior to this period treated exit tax primarily as a concern for individual Russian tax residents changing their status — a framework that many corporate structuring advisers assumed would not readily extend to corporate group departures driven by foreign beneficial owners. Russian courts have, in the majority of cases examined in this period, declined to accept that framing. The judicial tendency — particularly at the cassation level across several circuits — has been to look through the formal structure of a transaction and assess whether the departure of an Emirati-controlled group from its Russian operations constitutes a taxable event under the broader definition of income recognition in Russian tax legislation.

The key doctrinal shift is the consolidation of a "substance over form" standard when courts review exit-related transactions. Where a group's restructuring produced a transfer of assets out of Russian tax jurisdiction — whether through a reorganisation of legal entities, a disposal of participatory interests, or a combination of both — the Federal Tax Service has argued, and courts have generally accepted, that the latent gain embedded in Russian assets must be recognised at the point of exit. For groups with Emirati ultimate beneficial ownership, this analysis has been applied regardless of whether the beneficial owner itself was a party to the challenged transactions.

Critically, the Russia–UAE double tax agreement has not been treated by Russian courts as a self-standing exemption from exit tax obligations. The prevailing approach has been to characterise exit tax as a mechanism for recognising income that accrued during the period of Russian tax nexus, rather than as a withholding tax on outbound payments — a distinction that effectively narrows the treaty's protective scope in this context.

If your group structure has Emirati beneficial ownership and includes Russian legal entities undergoing restructuring or exit, the developments summarised here bear directly on your current or planned tax position — make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

§ II. Which Emirati-owned Russian groups are most affected?

The developments in Russian court practice on exit tax obligations do not affect all Emirati-linked structures equally. Based on the pattern of FTS Russia disputes reaching the courts, three categories of group structure have attracted the most intensive scrutiny.

The first category is Emirati holding companies that acquired participatory interests in Russian operating entities during the period of active foreign direct investment into Russia, and which subsequently sought to divest or transfer those interests as part of a broader exit. Russian courts have treated the latent appreciation in the value of the Russian operating entity — accumulated over the holding period — as income subject to Russian exit tax when realised on departure, even where the disposal itself occurred outside Russia.

The second category is groups that undertook internal reorganisations — mergers, spin-offs, or cross-border contributions — in the course of restructuring Russian operations without a full exit. Courts have examined whether such reorganisations, when followed by a reduction in Russian tax nexus, amount to a partial exit triggering proportionate exit tax obligations under Russian law. The majority of decisions in this period have affirmed that they can.

The third, and for in-house counsel the most practically significant, category is groups that relied on the neutral treatment of Russian real estate-holding entities under the Russia–UAE double tax agreement. Under the established treaty provisions, gains from the disposal of shares in companies whose value is derived principally from Russian immovable property may remain taxable in Russia even under the treaty. Courts have confirmed and extended that principle in the exit tax context — meaning that UAE-linked structures holding Russian real estate through intermediate Russian entities face a compounding exposure: both the treaty carve-out and the exit tax doctrine may apply simultaneously.

An additional dynamic that in-house counsel must account for is the interaction between exit tax obligations and Russian controlled foreign company rules. Groups that ceased to manage their Russian controlled foreign companies actively — as part of a de facto departure — have in some cases faced FTS assessments treating the cessation of active management as a triggering event alongside the underlying asset disposal. This dual-track assessment approach has been upheld in several arbitrazh court decisions reviewed in 2026 and 2027.

For in-house counsel managing a Russian subsidiary or a Russian asset-holding structure with UAE beneficial ownership, the combination of these judicial developments creates a layered exposure that requires assessment against the group's specific transaction history. The regulatory timeline for FTS audit cycles means that transactions completed as far back as three years may still fall within the window for challenge.

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"The exit tax analysis for Emirati-owned Russian groups has shifted from a theoretical risk to an active enforcement priority — the substance over form standard now applied by Russian courts has materially reduced the structuring options previously assumed to be available."— Kristina Kornouhova, Senior Lawyer, Practice Lead — Tax & Antitrust, Vetrov & Partners

" — Kristina Kornouhova, Senior Lawyer, Practice Lead — Tax & Antitrust, Vetrov & Partners

§ III. What should Emirati-owned groups with Russian exposure do now?

The practical priority for in-house counsel at this stage is diagnostic: establishing whether transactions already completed — reorganisations, partial disposals, contributions, or debt-for-equity arrangements — would meet the threshold that Russian courts have applied to trigger exit tax obligations under Russian law.

The starting point is a review of the group's Russian transaction history against the "substance over form" standard that courts have consolidated. This is not a straightforward desktop exercise: it requires analysis of the economic substance of each transaction, the trajectory of the group's Russian tax nexus over the relevant period, and the interplay between any treaty protections invoked and the exit tax characterisation that the FTS would apply. A number of groups have found, in the course of FTS audits already under way in 2027, that internal documentation prepared for corporate governance purposes does not adequately address the exit tax analysis — creating both an evidentiary gap and a negotiating disadvantage in pre-litigation discussions with the FTS.

For groups that have not yet completed their exit from Russian operations, the implications are more immediate. The timing and structure of remaining disposals should be reviewed in light of the current judicial approach before transactions are executed. The exit tax exposure identified in this review will not necessarily make a transaction unviable, but it will affect the economics and the required documentation — and addressing it after the FTS has opened an audit significantly narrows the available options.

There are also procedural considerations that in-house counsel should be aware of. Russian court practice has developed a number of grounds on which exit tax assessments have been successfully challenged — including challenges to the FTS's valuation methodology for the Russian assets said to constitute the taxable base, and procedural challenges to the conduct of the FTS's pre-assessment investigation. These grounds are not universally available and their applicability depends heavily on the specific facts of each matter, but they represent a meaningful component of any well-prepared response to an FTS position on exit tax obligations.

For groups that are presently subjects of an FTS Russia dispute on exit tax, the window for pre-litigation resolution — through the mandatory complaint procedure before the regional FTS administration — remains available but time-limited. Groups that allow that window to close without a substantive engagement significantly reduce their optionality in subsequent proceedings. The Tax Controversy practice at Vetrov & Partners has represented foreign-owned groups in FTS disputes of this type, including matters involving UAE beneficial ownership and exit-related assessments.

Further analysis of the risk matrix relevant to these structures is set out in our briefing on key risk points in exit tax obligations on departure from Russia, and a detailed examination of the legislative and case-law framework is available in The law and practice of exit tax obligations in Russia.

For in-house counsel at Emirati-owned groups with Russian assets, an early assessment of exit tax exposure — before the FTS audit cycle reaches your structure — is the most effective risk management available at this stage. Make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com |

Frequently asked questions

Q: What specifically changed in Russian court practice on exit tax obligations for Emirati-owned groups in 2027?

A: The principal development is the consolidation by Russian courts — predominantly at cassation level — of a "substance over form" standard when assessing exit tax obligations arising from the departure of Emirati-controlled groups from their Russian operations. Prior to this period, the application of exit tax doctrine to corporate group departures driven by foreign beneficial owners was contested. Courts have increasingly held that where a restructuring or disposal results in a transfer of assets out of Russian tax jurisdiction, the latent gain embedded in those assets must be recognised as income at the point of exit. The Russia–UAE double tax agreement has not been treated as a self-standing exemption from this analysis.

Q: Which Emirati-owned Russian structures face the greatest exit tax exposure under current Russian law?

A: Three categories have attracted the most intensive FTS scrutiny and court attention. First, Emirati holding companies that disposed of participatory interests in Russian operating entities as part of an exit — where the accumulated appreciation in value of the Russian entity is treated as taxable income on departure. Second, groups that undertook internal reorganisations reducing Russian tax nexus without a full exit, which courts have in the majority of cases treated as capable of triggering proportionate exit tax obligations. Third, groups holding Russian real estate through intermediate Russian entities, where both the double tax agreement carve-out for immovable property and the exit tax doctrine may apply simultaneously — a compounding exposure that in-house counsel frequently underestimate when reviewing the group's overall Russia position.

Q: What should an Emirati-owned group with Russian assets do in response to these developments?

A: The immediate practical step is a diagnostic review of the group's Russian transaction history against the "substance over form" standard that courts have applied — covering reorganisations, partial disposals, and any reduction in Russian tax nexus completed within the FTS's audit window. For groups with transactions still to complete, the timing and structure of remaining disposals should be reviewed before execution. For groups already subject to an FTS Russia dispute on exit tax, engagement through the mandatory pre-litigation complaint procedure is time-limited — allowing that window to close substantially reduces available options in subsequent proceedings. Vetrov & Partners' Tax Controversy practice can assist with each stage of this analysis. Make an enquiry: info@vetrovpartners.com.

Practitioner note

This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.

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