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The law and practice of competition law and merger clearance in Uzbekistan in the technology and software sector

Nodira Yusupova · October 2026 · 13 min read

Foreign tech companies entering Uzbekistan face merger clearance and competition rules that differ materially from EU norms. Make an enquiry.

Unlike the European Union's single-market competition framework, which rests on a consolidated supranational enforcement body, Uzbekistan's competition law operates through a national regulatory model that has undergone substantive reform since 2012 and continues to develop at pace. For the general counsel of a foreign technology or software company considering an acquisition, a joint venture, or a market entry in Uzbekistan, the domestic competition rules present both familiar concepts and material procedural differences that require early attention. The framework draws on CIS model legislation yet diverges in important respects — particularly on merger clearance thresholds, dominance assessment in digital markets, and the treatment of cross-border transactions touching Uzbekistan-resident entities. Understanding the current architecture, and where enforcement practice is evolving, is essential to structuring any inbound technology deal without regulatory exposure.

§ I. The legal framework governing competition in Uzbekistan

The principal statute governing competition in Uzbekistan is the Law on Competition, which was substantially revised and has been periodically amended since its adoption. The law establishes prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements, abuses of dominance, and unfair competition, and creates the pre-clearance regime for economic concentrations — the Uzbek equivalent of merger control. Enforcement authority rests with the State Committee for Competition of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Goskomkonkurentsiya), an independent executive body accountable directly to the Cabinet of Ministers. The State Committee for Competition is the sole body competent to issue clearance for transactions that meet the statutory notification thresholds, to conduct market investigations, and to impose administrative sanctions for competition infringements.

Uzbekistan is not a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. This distinction matters: EAEU supranational competition rules administered by the Eurasian Economic Commission, which apply to transactions affecting markets across Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, do not extend to Uzbekistan. A transaction that triggers parallel EAEU merger clearance — for example, an acquisition by a Russian technology group of a Uzbekistan-based target with operations also in Kazakhstan — will require separate filings before two distinct authorities: the Eurasian Economic Commission for the EAEU dimension, and the State Committee for Competition for the Uzbekistan-specific dimension. Counsel unfamiliar with this split regularly underestimates the filing calendar.

Uzbekistan is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and CIS model legislation on competition has influenced the structure of the domestic law. However, CIS model acts are not directly applicable — they inform legislative drafting but do not create enforceable rights or obligations. The operative source remains Uzbek national law and the secondary normative acts issued by the State Committee for Competition.

§ II. Merger clearance thresholds and notification obligations — what triggers a filing?

The Law on Competition imposes a mandatory pre-merger notification obligation on transactions that meet specified quantitative thresholds. Under the current framework, a filing is generally required where the combined assets or combined turnover of the parties to the transaction exceed thresholds set in Uzbek soum terms established by the State Committee for Competition's normative regulations. Because these thresholds are periodically revised and expressed in national currency, the effective monetary equivalent in US dollars or euros fluctuates; foreign clients should verify the current threshold values with Uzbek counsel at the time of structuring.

The transactions subject to notification include: mergers and consolidations of legal entities; acquisitions of shares or participation interests giving the acquirer control or a qualifying minority stake; and certain asset acquisitions where the asset forms the basis of a separate business in the Uzbek market. Intra-group transactions — restructurings between entities under common control — are generally exempt from pre-merger notification, but the exemption requires careful analysis where the group structure is complex or where one of the entities involved has third-party minority shareholders.

For technology and software sector transactions specifically, the relevant market for dominance and threshold purposes is assessed by the State Committee for Competition using a combination of product market definition (what does the software or platform do, and who are its functional substitutes) and geographic market definition (is the relevant market national, or does it extend across CIS territories?). In digital markets, geographic boundaries are less settled than in traditional product markets, and the State Committee for Competition has not yet developed the granular sector-specific guidance that EU competition authorities have issued on algorithms, data, and platform market definition. Foreign clients structuring software acquisitions or technology joint ventures should therefore anticipate a degree of regulatory dialogue — rather than an administrative rubber-stamp — where the product market is novel or where network effects create plausible dominance arguments.

§ III. How does the State Committee for Competition assess dominance in the technology sector?

The Law on Competition defines a dominant position by reference to market share thresholds: an undertaking is presumed dominant where its share of the relevant market exceeds a specified percentage. The presumption is rebuttable. For technology and software markets, however, the application of market share thresholds raises complications that are well-recognised in comparative competition law: a firm may hold a very high share of an app category or software vertical while facing rapid competitive displacement from adjacent products; conversely, a firm with a modest share of a formally defined market may exercise significant market power through proprietary data or network effects.

The State Committee for Competition's practice in digital markets remains at an early stage relative to the EU Digital Markets Act framework or the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service's approach to platform regulation. In practice, investigations in the technology sector have tended to arise from complaints by domestic competitors regarding exclusionary conduct — for example, bundling arrangements, refusal to interoperate, or preferential self-placement in software distribution channels. The committee has authority to issue binding remedies, including divestment orders and compulsory licensing in exceptional cases, though these are not yet standard outcomes in the technology sector.

For foreign companies operating software platforms in Uzbekistan — whether through a locally incorporated subsidiary, a representative office, or a cross-border service model — the dominance regime means that commercial decisions on pricing, distribution arrangements, and technical standards should be reviewed against competition law at the outset of operations, not retrospectively when a complaint has been filed.

"Uzbekistan's competition framework is developing in a direction broadly consistent with CIS modernisation trends, but the technology sector sits at the frontier of administrative practice — where the rules are written but their application to complex digital business models is still being worked out in real time." — Nodira Yusupova, Contributing Regional Analyst — Uzbekistan, Vetrov & Partners

§ IV. Cross-border transactions and the position of foreign technology companies — what specific risks apply?

Foreign companies investing in or acquiring Uzbekistan-based technology businesses face three layers of competition law exposure that differ from a purely domestic transaction. Understanding which layer applies, and in what sequence, is the primary task of pre-transaction regulatory planning.

The first layer is the Uzbekistan domestic merger clearance filing described in § II above. This applies whenever the transaction meets the local thresholds and involves an Uzbekistan-resident target or an asset located in Uzbekistan. The filing must be made in Uzbek, supported by Uzbek-language copies of transaction documents (or certified translations), and the review period under the standard procedure is typically 30 days, extendable by the State Committee for Competition where additional information is required or where the transaction raises substantive competition concerns. Clients undergoing multi-jurisdictional clearance processes — for example, a European strategic acquirer that must also notify the European Commission or national competition authorities in EU member states — should plan for the Uzbekistan review period to run concurrently with those other filings rather than sequentially, to avoid unnecessary deal delay.

The second layer applies to transactions that also involve EAEU-resident entities. As noted in § I above, the Eurasian Economic Commission has jurisdiction over concentrations affecting EAEU markets where the combined turnover of the parties exceeds the supranational thresholds. A foreign technology group acquiring a target with material operations in both Uzbekistan and, say, Russia or Kazakhstan will require a separate EAEU filing. The two proceedings are procedurally independent: the EEC and the Uzbekistan State Committee for Competition do not share information or coordinate timing as a matter of standing practice. Practitioners advising on such transactions must manage both timetables in parallel.

The third layer concerns substantive restrictions on foreign ownership in specific technology sectors. Uzbekistan's legislation on foreign investment and on certain regulated activities — including telecommunications, digital financial services, and certain categories of strategic infrastructure software — imposes sectoral ownership restrictions or licensing requirements that interact with, but are distinct from, the general competition law framework. A foreign company acquiring a controlling stake in a Uzbekistan telecommunications software provider, for instance, must obtain both merger clearance from the State Committee for Competition and the relevant sectoral licence or approval from the Ministry of Digital Technologies. Failure to identify and sequence these parallel approvals is one of the most common sources of regulatory delay in inbound technology transactions.

§ V. Practical guidance — structuring inbound technology transactions to manage competition law risk

Foreign technology companies entering the Uzbekistan market have several structural choices that affect competition law exposure from the outset. Each deserves specific attention.

Greenfield entry versus acquisition. A greenfield operation — establishing a new Uzbek legal entity to develop or distribute software — does not trigger merger clearance obligations, because no economic concentration of existing market participants occurs. Competition law remains relevant (dominance and anti-competitive agreements apply from the first day of commercial activity), but the administrative clearance workload is materially lower. Acquisitions, by contrast, engage the full merger clearance regime. For foreign companies with a strategic preference for speed of market entry, the greenfield path removes regulatory uncertainty, at the cost of losing the established customer base and distribution infrastructure that an acquisition would provide.

Joint ventures. A joint venture with an Uzbekistan-based technology partner — whether a locally incorporated entity or a subsidiary of a foreign group — may constitute an economic concentration triggering notification, depending on whether it is a full-function joint venture and whether the parties' combined thresholds are met. The Uzbek framework follows the general principle, shared across many CIS jurisdictions, that full-function joint ventures (those operating independently in the market rather than serving purely internal functions) are treated as concentrations for clearance purposes. Partial-function joint ventures — collaboration agreements or contractual R&D arrangements that do not create an independent business — fall outside the merger control regime but may engage the anti-competitive agreements prohibition if they involve price co-ordination, market sharing, or related restrictions.

Minority acquisitions. Acquisitions of non-controlling minority stakes below the notification threshold are not subject to pre-clearance. However, the State Committee for Competition retains jurisdiction to investigate such transactions ex post if evidence emerges that the acquisition facilitated co-ordinated conduct or reduced competitive incentives. In technology markets where minority stakes often accompany commercial partnerships — distribution agreements, data-sharing arrangements, or API access licences — the combined effect of the commercial agreement and the equity stake should be reviewed together.

Compliance programme considerations. For foreign technology companies already subject to competition compliance obligations in the EU or the UK, the Uzbekistan framework is broadly aligned at the level of core prohibitions (cartel conduct, abuse of dominance) but differs on procedural detail, penalty structure, and leniency availability. Uzbekistan does not currently operate a formal leniency programme of the type available to cartel participants in EU jurisdictions. Companies with global compliance programmes should ensure their Uzbekistan module reflects local procedural requirements, including the obligation to file merger notifications in Uzbek and the absence of a cartel immunity track.

Under Uzbekistan's competition enforcement framework, administrative fines for infringements — including failure to notify a qualifying transaction prior to completion — are calculated as a percentage of annual turnover on the relevant market. The consequence of completing a notifiable transaction without prior clearance (a so-called gun-jumping violation) includes both the administrative fine and the possibility of the State Committee for Competition investigating the substantive competition effects of the transaction after the fact. For foreign technology acquirers with reputational considerations in the Uzbekistan market, the procedural risk of gun-jumping is compounded by the practical difficulty of unwinding a completed transaction if the committee declines clearance.

Frequently asked questions

Q: What are the merger clearance thresholds in Uzbekistan, and do they apply to foreign-to-foreign transactions? A: The State Committee for Competition of Uzbekistan applies mandatory pre-merger notification to transactions where the combined assets or revenues of the parties exceed thresholds established in Uzbek soum terms under the Law on Competition. These thresholds are periodically revised, so foreign clients should verify current values with Uzbek counsel at the time of structuring. The notification obligation applies to transactions that affect the Uzbek market — including foreign-to-foreign acquisitions where the target has a subsidiary, assets, or revenues in Uzbekistan. There is no de minimis exemption for purely foreign groups if their Uzbek-market activities meet the threshold. Failure to file before completion constitutes a gun-jumping violation subject to administrative sanction.

Q: Is Uzbekistan subject to EAEU competition rules, and does an EAEU filing substitute for a national filing? A: Uzbekistan is not a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. EAEU supranational competition rules administered by the Eurasian Economic Commission do not apply to Uzbekistan's market, and an EAEU merger clearance filing does not satisfy the Uzbekistan national notification obligation. Transactions involving entities with operations in both EAEU member states (such as Russia or Kazakhstan) and Uzbekistan therefore require parallel filings before two separate authorities — the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Uzbekistan State Committee for Competition — under independent procedures and timetables.

Q: How does the Uzbekistan competition authority approach dominance in digital and software markets? A: The State Committee for Competition applies standard market share thresholds to determine whether an undertaking holds a dominant position, with the presumption of dominance arising above the statutory percentage. In digital and software markets, where market share may not fully capture competitive constraints from adjacent products, data advantages, or network effects, the committee retains discretion to assess dominance on a broader set of factors. The authority's practice in the technology sector is still developing; sector-specific guidance of the type published by EU competition authorities is not yet available. Foreign technology companies with significant market positions in Uzbekistan — whether measured by user numbers, revenue, or installed base — should treat the dominance analysis as an open question requiring legal assessment, not an assumed conclusion.

Q: Do foreign companies selling software into Uzbekistan on a cross-border basis (without a local entity) face competition law exposure? A: Competition law in Uzbekistan applies on the basis of effects on the Uzbek market, not solely on the basis of corporate presence. A foreign software company without a local entity but with substantial Uzbek-market revenues may still fall within the jurisdiction of the State Committee for Competition for purposes of the dominance regime and anti-competitive agreements prohibition. The merger clearance notification obligation, however, is triggered by the existence of an Uzbek-resident entity or Uzbek-market assets belonging to one of the transaction parties — a purely cross-border software licensing arrangement between two foreign entities with no Uzbek subsidiary or asset base would generally not trigger a filing obligation.

Q: What is the standard review period for merger clearance in Uzbekistan, and can it be extended? A: The standard review period under Uzbek competition law is typically 30 calendar days from the date the State Committee for Competition acknowledges receipt of a complete notification filing. The committee has authority to extend this period where it requires additional information, where the transaction raises substantive competition concerns that require more detailed market analysis, or where remedies are being negotiated. In practice, transactions in novel sectors — including software platforms and digital financial services — have in some instances taken longer to clear than the standard period, reflecting the authority's developing analytical capacity in technology markets. Foreign acquirers should build a conservative clearance timeline into their transaction schedule and resist the temptation to set a signing-to-closing longstop date that assumes the minimum review period will apply.

Practitioner note

This briefing is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, write in confidence to info@vetrovpartners.com.

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